Not Another U-23 Olympic Event!

Today, I learned about David Stern’s position that the Olympics be restricted to a U-23 tournament (like soccer, but without the exceptions) because the NBA teams are loaning out players to international competitions for free.  In an article on www.sheridanhoops.com, deputy commissioner is quoted as saying, “So when you have the Olympics, the World Cup of Basketball, we are taking a very close look at whether it makes sense from an NBA standpoint and a global basketball standpoint for the top players to be playing at that level on a year round basis.  So what we have told FIBA, and what David has announced several times, is that we are all in through the London Olympics, and then post-London Olympics, we want to step back together with USA Basketball, led by Jerry Colangelo and Patrick Baumann in FIBA and … we need to take a long-term view of what makes sense both for the NBA and for the game.”  I also read Patrick Minton’s post at www.thenbageek.com which attacks this viewpoint.  I am going to write an article with a similar position, but for different reasons.

Why would anyone want this?  The Dream Team put basketball back on the map.  Silver mentions the World Cup of Basketball (formerly known as the World Championships).  The problem is that nobody actually watches the World Cup of Basketball that I have ever met.  I can tell you that we beat Turkey in Turkey last time, and that’s just about all I can definitively say off the top of my head.  And that’s a lot compared to (I’m sure) most people.

However, everyone watches the Olympics.  They are broadcast all over the world.  People are intrigued.  They (they being the Summer Olympics) are held in marquee cities like Athens, Beijing, and London.  By comparison, the last three World Cups were held in Indianapolis; Saitama, Japan; and Istanbul.  What major tournament is held in Indianapolis (besides the Final Four)?  Even Istanbul and Madrid (the host of the 2014 edition) don’t measure up to London!  When you think Madrid, you think Real Madrid and capital of Spain.  When you think London, there’s Buckingham Palace, Big Ben, England in general, etc.

Other than soccer, what other sport uses the Olympics to showcase its U-23’s?  Soccer can do it because its World Cup is so huge that it’s almost ridiculous.  Let’s face it, basketball is only truly popular in China, the U.S. (and Puerto Rico), and parts of Europe.  Even in the latter area, soccer trumps basketball in popularity to a phenomenal degree.  Let’s take Spain for an example (the second-best basketball-playing nation in the world).  Its largest basketball stadium in the Liga ACB, Caja Laboral’s at 15,374, has a smaller capacity than La Liga’s smallest, Rayo Vallecano’s at 15,489.  Seriously!

Besides, the international basketball environment is becoming more competitive.  In their 2008 Olympic run, Spain had seven one-time NBA players on the roster.  Puerto Rico has beaten the USA in the Olympics, albeit that we Americans had a poor roster that year.  (Hunt around in the Wages of Wins archives for more details.)  In the last three Basketball World Cups, only the US has medaled multiple times, and we lost in the quarterfinals one year!  International play is about asserting your dominance in a particular sport.  I don’t even see why the NBA should have the option to block Olympic entry; I mean, the NBA is affiliated with FIBA.  The Olympics are about pride; why should we deny ourselves the pride of a tournament well won?

I think the whole idea is absolutely ridiculous, especially since the Olympics occur during the offseason.  Just let the players play.  Besides, they can always refuse if they don’t want to go!

Background on Virginie Razzano

Today, Virginie Razzano defeated Serena Williams in the first round of the French Open.  It was the first time that Williams had ever lost in the first round of a major.  But who is Virginie Razzano?

Razzano was born on May 12, 1983, in Dijon, France.  She is 5’8″, 140.  The right-handed Frenchwoman turned pro in 1999.  She has only won three professional tournaments in her career: the 2001 Open Gaz de France doubles tournament in tandem with Croatian Iva Majoli, the 2007 Guangzhou International Women’s Open, and the 2007 AIG Japan Open Tennis Championships, where she defeated Venus Williams in three sets.  The latter two events were won within a week of each other.  She has reached the fourth round of a major three times: at the 2006 US Open, at the 2009 French Open, and at 2009 Wimbledon.  Wimbledon is the major where she has a winning record, although she is 12-12 at the US Open.  Currently ranked No. 111, her best ranking was N0. 19 on September 14, 2009.  On May 16 of last year, her longtime coach and fiance died of a brain tumor.  She is a resident of Nimes, France.

 

Why We Need Title IX

“All men are born equally free.”  Salmon P. Chase

This is is an essay that  I wrote that a teacher of mine thought was really good.  It is a five-paragraph persuasive essay defending Title IX.  It is written from the viewpoint of a person with a very athletic sister and a tennis-loving mother.

Why We Need Title IX

Equal opportunity for both men and women has been a widely-debated issue in the past century.  It would be irresponsible to halt the ongoing progression toward complete gender equity.  Recently, there has been an uproar concerning the athletic portion of Title IX, with critics citing disadvantages toward men’s collegiate sports.  Title IX is the federal law that makes gender discrimination in federally-funded areas illegal.  However, repealing this important law would be a step backward and a mistake.  Title IX legislation must be maintained because it has already led to massive growth in women’s sports, it protects members of both genders, and it is still needed to bridge the remaining gender equality gap.

The institution of Title IX has led to a massive growth in the number of women playing competitive sports.  Between 1971 and 2001, the number of women playing NCAA sports more than quintupled from approximately 30,000 to about 160,000.  Over the same period of time, the number of women playing high schools sports increased twelve times over.  Between 1991 and 2006, the proportion of women playing in NCAA Division I sports increased from thirty-one to forty-five percent.  NCAA Divisions II and III saw boosts in female proportionality of nine and seven percent, respectively, during that same time frame.  Since then, there have been women’s professional leagues added in sports such as basketball, soccer, volleyball, softball, and bowling.  The number of women playing sports has increased dramatically since Title IX’s passing.

This landmark legislation protects members of both genders.  The exact wording of the legislation is, “No person in the United States, on the basis of sex, shall be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any educational program or activity receiving federal financial assistance.”  Many people argue that Title IX has led to the cutting of many men’s athletic programs, particularly Olympic sports.  This argument is invalid for two reasons.  First of all, some of these cuts have been made because of a misinterpretation of the law.  Many believe that Title IX says that the athletic scholarships provided by a specific school must either represent the gender proportion found at the institution or approach said proportion.  However, schools may use surveys to gauge student interest in carrying a specific sport.  Only if there is sufficient interest does the school have to sponsor the sport.  The second reason that the argument is invalid is that cutting of men’s sports simply to comply with Title IX is an ironic violation of the law; they are being denied the benefits of participating in their sport on the basis of sex, albeit indirectly.  It is unfortunate that schools often have constrained budgets, but they should be able to fit both men and women’s sports into the equation without eliminating the pre-existing activities.  It is possible to do this, perhaps with cuts to the football and women’s crew programs which both carry incredibly high scholarship totals to balance the total share.  As I have already mentioned, the quota system is misguided and not the supreme beginning and end of the discussion.   This legislation protects members of both genders.

Despite all the strides that Title IX has made, there is still work to be done.  Even in Division I, the section of the NCAA that has the highest women’s participation, only 45% of the athletes were women in 2006.  In 2001, women received only 35% of the operating budgets at NCAA schools.  Furthermore, men still receive 90% of all of the NCAA’s media coverage.  Even though professional women’s sport leagues have been started, many of them are unsuccessful because of economic mismanagement and/or overestimation of popular interest.  Even though they are being provided with some opportunities, there is also a lack of interest that can be tied to childhood experiences.  Marilyn McNeil, the female athletic director of Monmouth University, said in a 2001 article on sports giant ESPN’s website, “At our institution, we’ve got twenty-eight spots for baseball, and, maybe, forty guys who think they can play baseball.  I’ve got twenty to twenty-five women trying to get twenty-two softball spots.  Women tend to not get involved unless they think they can contribute.”  Even though Title IX does not require that the proportion of scholarships reflect the student population, this is its ultimate goal.  If it were to be rescinded at this juncture, it is very possible that the women’s participation rates will stagnate or regress, which is undesirable.  On the other hand, if women are given equal opportunities, or at least as equal as possible, it would bolster interest in women’s sports in both participants and customers.  Title IX’s job is by no means complete.

A future where Title IX will have been removed could be disastrous.  Over the past hundred years, we have made great strides in gradually introducing our society to gender equity.  Title IX does a great, if not perfect, job of reinforcing this and our newfound sociological ideals.  It needs to remain the law of the land for many reasons.  For one, it has already led to great advances in women’s sports participation rates at the college and high school levels.  For another, it protects members of both genders.  Finally, it still is needed to close the equality fissure that remains.  The world of college sports has evolved from being extremely androcentric to one that has a great number of women participating. Unfortunately, it is very possible that the removal of Title IX would either slow, stop, or possibly even cause college athletics to revert to its previous bias in some ways.  Why would anyone want that?

Final NBA Player Valuations

Since I did my “Introducing Composite Score Above Replacement Level and Composite Score Above Bench” last month, I have read a lot of posts by others and written many myself.  I have also found a tentative Replacement Level of .025.  So, I decided to use Composite Score (a straight average of Win Shares Per 48 and Wins Produced Per 48) to determine how much money each player was worth this season.  I came up with three methods.  Method A strictly uses Composite Wins Above Replacement.  The formula is:

Method A=473,604+(1,700,000*Composite Wins Above Replacement)

The 473,604 modifier is in there to adjust for the minimum salary.

My second measure strictly uses a player’s actual value.  Its formula is:

 Method B=(((Composite Score/0.025)-1)*1,700,000)+473,604

This adjusts for replacement level an the value of a win.

My third formula takes the second formula and rewards/penalizes players for their minutes logged.  The formula is:

Method C=Method B/(1,500/minutes played)

I also averaged the three values out.  Here is the whole list, separated by team and then average value.  I apologize that the Averages column is squished; I have had problems with this before and been unable to fix it.  The full table is available at valuationsfinaldata.

Unadjusted Composite Scores and PERrates
Name	Team	Pos	Min	Score	WAR	Value A	Value B	Value C	Average
Marvin Williams	ATL	SF	1500	0.179	4.8	$8,654,854	$10,945,604	$10,945,604	$10,182,021
Jeff Teague	ATL	PG	2183	0.135	5.0	$8,978,208	$7,953,604	$11,575,145	$9,502,319
Josh Smith	ATL	PF	2329	0.128	5.0	$8,928,359	$7,443,604	$11,557,436	$9,309,800
Joe Johnson	ATL	SF	2127	0.133	4.8	$8,609,379	$7,817,604	$11,085,362	$9,170,782
Zaza Pachulia	ATL	C	1640	0.150	4.3	$7,734,021	$8,973,604	$9,811,140	$8,839,588
Al Horford	ATL	C	348	0.184	1.1	$2,427,117	$11,251,604	$2,610,372	$5,429,698
Tracy McGrady	ATL	SG	837	0.136	1.9	$3,764,060	$8,021,604	$4,476,055	$5,420,573
Willie Green	ATL	SG	922	0.113	1.7	$3,347,171	$6,457,604	$3,969,274	$4,591,350
Ivan Johnson	ATL	PF	934	0.107	1.6	$3,169,556	$6,015,604	$3,745,716	$4,310,292
Vladimir Radmanovic	ATL	PF	755	0.096	1.1	$2,358,745	$5,267,604	$2,651,361	$3,425,903
Kirk Hinrich	ATL	PG	1237	0.062	0.9	$2,072,684	$2,955,604	$2,437,388	$2,488,559
Jannero Pargo	ATL	PG	671	0.072	0.7	$1,578,657	$3,635,604	$1,626,327	$2,280,196
Erick Dampier	ATL	C	83	0.062	0.1	$580,899	$2,955,604	$163,543	$1,233,349
Jerry Stackhouse	ATL	SG	272	0.048	0.1	$690,354	$2,003,604	$363,320	$1,019,093
Jason Collins	ATL	C	308	-0.024	-0.3	-$60,904	-$2,858,396	-$586,924	-$1,168,741
Donald Sloan	ATL-NOH-CLE	G	669	-0.019	-0.6	-$568,921	-$2,518,396	-$1,123,205	-$1,403,507
Kevin Garnett	BOS	PF	1864	0.173	5.7	$10,244,071	$10,537,604	$13,094,729	$11,292,135
Rajon Rondo	BOS	PG	1957	0.166	5.7	$10,246,373	$10,061,604	$13,127,039	$11,145,005
Paul Pierce	BOS	SF	2075	0.156	5.7	$10,100,739	$9,381,604	$12,977,886	$10,820,076
Ray Allen	BOS	SG	1565	0.166	4.6	$8,288,823	$10,061,604	$10,497,607	$9,616,011
Greg Stiemsma	BOS	C	766	0.176	2.4	$4,556,544	$10,707,604	$5,468,016	$6,910,721
Brandon Bass	BOS	PF	1868	0.099	2.9	$5,336,242	$5,471,604	$6,813,971	$5,873,939
Chris Wilcox	BOS	C	481	0.122	1.0	$2,117,522	$7,035,604	$2,256,084	$3,803,070
Avery Bradley	BOS	PG	1368	0.078	1.5	$3,017,229	$4,043,604	$3,687,767	$3,582,867
Jermaine O’Neal	BOS	C	570	0.069	0.5	$1,351,760	$3,431,604	$1,304,010	$2,029,125
Mickael Pietrus	BOS	SF	921	0.058	0.6	$1,550,023	$2,717,604	$1,668,609	$1,978,745
Sasha Pavlovic	BOS	SF	527	0.042	0.2	$781,570	$1,595,604	$560,589	$979,254
Keyon Dooling	BOS	PG	661	0.016	-0.1	$251,205	-$172,396	-$75,969	$947
E’Twaun Moore	BOS	G	331	0.012	-0.1	$321,206	-$410,396	-$90,561	-$59,917
Marquis Daniels	BOS	SF	484	0.011	-0.1	$225,050	-$512,396	-$165,333	-$150,893
JaJuan Johnson	BOS	F/C	298	-0.017	-0.3	$30,329	-$2,382,396	-$473,303	-$941,790
Derrick Brown	CHA	SF	1443	0.117	2.8	$5,149,826	$6,695,604	$6,441,171	$6,095,534
Bismack Biyombo	CHA	PF	1455	0.052	0.8	$1,864,948	$2,309,604	$2,240,316	$2,138,289
Reggie Williams	CHA	SG	747	0.052	0.4	$1,187,923	$2,309,604	$1,150,183	$1,549,237
Gerald Henderson	CHA	SG	1831	0.033	0.3	$992,387	$1,017,604	$1,242,155	$1,084,049
D.J. Augustin	CHA	PG	1408	0.029	0.1	$648,137	$711,604	$667,959	$675,900
Eduardo Najera	CHA	PF	270	0.027	0.0	$492,729	$609,604	$109,729	$404,021
D.J. White	CHA	PF	1098	0.021	-0.1	$298,610	$167,604	$122,686	$196,300
DeSagana Diop	CHA	C	325	0.003	-0.2	$214,620	-$1,056,396	-$228,886	-$356,887
Kemba Walker	CHA	PG	1792	0.010	-0.6	-$478,396	-$546,396	-$652,761	-$559,184
Corey Maggette	CHA	SF	881	-0.007	-0.6	-$509,262	-$1,668,396	-$979,905	-$1,052,521
Jamario Moon	CHA	SF	123	-0.065	-0.2	$83,720	-$5,612,396	-$460,216	-$1,996,298
Matt Carroll	CHA	SG	596	-0.054	-1.0	-$1,183,400	-$4,864,396	-$1,932,787	-$2,660,194
Byron Mullens	CHA	C	1465	-0.039	-1.9	-$2,821,120	-$3,844,396	-$3,754,693	-$3,473,403
Tyrus Thomas	CHA	PF	1013	-0.063	-1.9	-$2,683,579	-$5,510,396	-$3,721,354	-$3,971,776
Cory Higgins	CHA	G	423	-0.204	-2.0	-$2,957,102	-$15,098,396	-$4,257,748	-$7,437,749
Boris Diaw	CHA-SAS	PF	1424	0.033	0.2	$851,854	$983,604	$933,768	$923,075
Joakim Noah	CHI	C	1945	0.252	9.2	$16,110,594	$15,909,604	$20,629,453	$17,549,884
Carlos Boozer	CHI	PF	1948	0.169	5.8	$10,408,404	$10,265,604	$13,331,598	$11,335,202
Kyle Korver	CHI	SF	1469	0.168	4.4	$7,887,463	$10,163,604	$9,953,556	$9,334,875
Derrick Rose	CHI	PG	1375	0.173	4.2	$7,680,896	$10,537,604	$9,659,470	$9,292,657
Taj Gibson	CHI	PF	1284	0.172	3.9	$7,135,692	$10,435,604	$8,932,877	$8,834,724
Luol Deng	CHI	SF	2129	0.128	4.5	$8,202,318	$7,443,604	$10,564,955	$8,736,959
Ronnie Brewer	CHI	SG	1635	0.147	4.1	$7,509,213	$8,735,604	$9,521,808	$8,588,875
Omer Asik	CHI	C	971	0.177	3.1	$5,700,821	$10,809,604	$6,997,417	$7,835,947
Jimmy Butler	CHI	F	359	0.140	0.9	$1,935,781	$8,293,604	$1,984,936	$4,071,440
John Lucas	CHI	PG	726	0.091	1.0	$2,157,773	$4,927,604	$2,384,960	$3,156,779
C.J. Watson	CHI	PG	1159	0.068	1.0	$2,238,664	$3,397,604	$2,625,215	$2,753,828
Brian Scalabrine	CHI	PF	122	0.113	0.2	$851,677	$6,423,604	$522,453	$2,599,245
Richard Hamilton	CHI	SG	697	0.050	0.4	$1,090,739	$2,173,604	$1,010,001	$1,424,782
Mike James	CHI	PG	120	0.041	0.0	$539,479	$1,527,604	$122,208	$729,764
Anderson Varejao	CLE	C	785	0.195	2.8	$5,186,057	$11,999,604	$6,279,793	$7,821,818
Kyrie Irving	CLE	PG	1558	0.122	3.1	$5,825,983	$7,069,604	$7,342,962	$6,746,183
Alonzo Gee	CLE	SG	1827	0.098	2.8	$5,164,807	$5,403,604	$6,581,590	$5,716,667
Anthony Parker	CLE	SF	1280	0.070	1.2	$2,490,937	$3,499,604	$2,986,329	$2,992,290
Tristan Thompson	CLE	PF	1424	0.057	0.9	$2,087,471	$2,649,604	$2,515,357	$2,417,477
Omri Casspi	CLE	SF	1341	0.054	0.8	$1,850,923	$2,445,604	$2,186,370	$2,160,966
Manny Harris	CLE	SG	456	0.044	0.2	$772,379	$1,731,604	$526,408	$1,010,130
Luke Harangody	CLE	PF	231	0.047	0.1	$653,592	$1,969,604	$303,319	$975,505
Daniel Gibson	CLE	PG	916	0.026	0.0	$506,046	$541,604	$330,740	$459,463
Semih Erden	CLE	C	333	0.016	-0.1	$367,460	-$138,396	-$30,724	$66,113
Samardo Samuels	CLE	PF	825	0.017	-0.1	$239,854	-$70,396	-$38,718	$43,580
Antwan Jamison	CLE	PF	2151	0.017	-0.4	-$173,937	-$104,396	-$149,704	-$142,679
D.J. Kennedy	CLE	F	59	-0.043	-0.1	$332,557	-$4,116,396	-$161,912	-$1,315,250
Mychel Thompson	CLE	G	95	-0.110	-0.3	$21,068	-$8,672,396	-$549,252	-$3,066,860
Ryan Hollins	CLE-BOS	C	522	-0.022	-0.5	-$386,065	-$2,688,396	-$935,562	-$1,336,674
Ramon Sessions	CLE-LAL	SG	1707	0.124	3.5	$6,428,545	$7,171,604	$8,161,285	$7,253,811
Christian Eyenga	CLE-LAL	SF	102	-0.057	-0.2	$179,185	-$5,068,396	-$344,651	-$1,744,621
Lester Hudson	CLE-MEM	SG	334	-0.010	-0.2	$59,583	-$1,906,396	-$424,491	-$757,101
Ben Uzoh	CLE-TOR	SG	370	0.081	0.4	$1,207,437	$4,281,604	$1,056,129	$2,181,723
Brandan Wright	DAL	PF	791	0.250	3.7	$6,762,878	$15,739,604	$8,300,018	$10,267,500
Shawn Marion	DAL	SF	1919	0.137	4.5	$8,085,637	$8,089,604	$10,349,300	$8,841,514
Jason Kidd	DAL	PG	1379	0.156	3.7	$6,847,170	$9,347,604	$8,593,564	$8,262,779
Dirk Nowtizki	DAL	PF	2079	0.121	4.1	$7,505,388	$6,967,604	$9,657,099	$8,043,364
Brendan Haywood	DAL	C	1146	0.128	2.4	$4,633,823	$7,443,604	$5,686,913	$5,921,447
Jason Terry	DAL	SG	2000	0.095	2.9	$5,431,937	$5,233,604	$6,978,139	$5,881,227
Ian Mahinmi	DAL	C	1139	0.123	2.3	$4,426,883	$7,137,604	$5,419,821	$5,661,436
Delonte West	DAL	SG	1060	0.116	2.0	$3,889,896	$6,661,604	$4,707,533	$5,086,344
Vince Carter	DAL	SG	1542	0.094	2.2	$4,241,867	$5,165,604	$5,310,241	$4,905,904
Rodrigue Beaubois	DAL	PG	1151	0.085	1.4	$2,919,479	$4,553,604	$3,494,132	$3,655,738
Dominique Jones	DAL	SG	268	0.061	0.2	$815,304	$2,921,604	$521,993	$1,419,634
Yi Jianlian	DAL	PF	203	-0.047	-0.3	-$44,046	-$4,422,396	-$598,498	-$1,688,313
Brian Cardinal	DAL	PF	277	-0.060	-0.5	-$355,376	-$5,272,396	-$973,636	-$2,200,469
Lamar Odom	DAL	PF	1027	-0.032	-1.2	-$1,599,652	-$3,402,396	-$2,329,507	-$2,443,852
Kelenna Azuibuike	DAL	SG	18	-0.391	-0.2	$208,404	-$27,814,396	-$333,773	-$9,313,255
Sean Williams	DAL-BOS	C	107	0.211	0.4	$1,178,467	$13,121,604	$936,008	$5,078,693
Kenneth Faried	DEN	PF	1037	0.265	5.2	$9,269,740	$16,759,604	$11,586,473	$12,538,606
Ty Lawson	DEN	PG	2124	0.170	6.4	$11,343,617	$10,299,604	$14,584,239	$12,075,820
Kosta Koufos	DEN	C	792	0.197	2.8	$5,298,204	$12,169,604	$6,425,551	$7,964,453
Arron Afflalo	DEN	SG	2086	0.115	3.9	$7,122,729	$6,593,604	$9,169,505	$7,628,613
Chris Andersen	DEN	C	486	0.219	2.0	$3,812,829	$13,665,604	$4,427,656	$7,302,030
Andre Miller	DEN	PG	1809	0.087	2.3	$4,445,867	$4,689,604	$5,655,662	$4,930,378
Danilo Gallinari	DEN	PF	1351	0.098	2.0	$3,942,578	$5,403,604	$4,866,846	$4,737,676
Corey Brewer	DEN	SG	1287	0.083	1.5	$3,094,526	$4,383,604	$3,761,132	$3,746,421
Julyan Stone	DEN	G	179	0.147	0.5	$1,243,863	$8,735,604	$1,042,449	$3,673,972
Rudy Fernandez	DEN	SG	710	0.095	1.0	$2,233,812	$5,233,604	$2,477,239	$3,314,885
Timofey Mozgov	DEN	C	687	0.059	0.5	$1,288,701	$2,751,604	$1,260,235	$1,766,847
Jordan Hamilton	DEN	G/F	258	0.065	0.2	$834,535	$3,159,604	$543,452	$1,512,530
Al Harrington	DEN	PF	1761	0.037	0.4	$1,190,845	$1,255,604	$1,474,079	$1,306,843
Wilson Chandler	DEN	SF	215	-0.038	-0.3	-$6,115	-$3,810,396	-$546,157	-$1,454,223
DeMarre Carroll	DEN-UTA	SF	348	0.070	0.3	$1,028,229	$3,533,604	$819,796	$1,793,876
Nene	DEN-WAS	C	1110	0.105	1.9	$3,618,604	$5,913,604	$4,376,067	$4,636,092
Greg Monroe	DET	C	2082	0.178	6.6	$11,718,573	$10,843,604	$15,050,922	$12,537,700
Jonas Jerebko	DET	SF	1468	0.129	3.2	$5,854,742	$7,511,604	$7,351,356	$6,905,901
Rodney Stuckey	DET	PG	1643	0.109	2.9	$5,332,434	$6,151,604	$6,738,057	$6,074,032
Ben Wallace	DET	C	980	0.136	2.3	$4,326,229	$8,021,604	$5,240,781	$5,862,871
Vernon Macklin	DET	PF	135	0.209	0.5	$1,350,963	$12,951,604	$1,165,644	$5,156,071
Jason Maxiell	DET	PF	1466	0.065	1.2	$2,524,477	$3,159,604	$3,087,986	$2,924,022
Tayshaun Prince	DET	SF	2087	0.048	1.0	$2,173,639	$2,037,604	$2,834,986	$2,348,743
Ben Gordon	DET	SG	1398	0.047	0.6	$1,538,123	$1,935,604	$1,803,983	$1,759,237
Charlie Villanueva	DET	PF	180	0.057	0.1	$674,417	$2,615,604	$313,872	$1,201,298
Brandon Knight	DET	G	2128	0.023	-0.1	$285,187	$303,604	$430,713	$339,835
Damien Wilkins	DET	SF	922	0.022	-0.1	$359,314	$235,604	$144,818	$246,579
Walker Russell	DET	G	367	-0.049	-0.6	-$488,242	-$4,558,396	-$1,115,288	-$2,053,975
Will Bynum	DET	PG	514	-0.063	-0.9	-$1,128,363	-$5,510,396	-$1,888,229	-$2,842,329
Austin Daye	DET	PF	603	-0.113	-1.7	-$2,473,559	-$8,910,396	-$3,581,979	-$4,988,645
Brandon Rush	GSW	SG	1717	0.158	4.7	$8,530,984	$9,483,604	$10,855,565	$9,623,385
Dorell Wright	GSW	SF	1650	0.127	3.5	$6,434,229	$7,409,604	$8,150,564	$7,331,466
Stephen Curry	GSW	PG	732	0.164	2.1	$4,064,217	$9,891,604	$4,827,103	$6,260,974
Dominic McGuire	GSW	SF	1127	0.124	2.3	$4,425,148	$7,205,604	$5,413,810	$5,681,521
Chris Wright	GSW	F	186	0.208	0.7	$1,679,117	$12,917,604	$1,601,783	$5,399,501
David Lee	GSW	C	2121	0.078	2.3	$4,454,898	$4,077,604	$5,765,732	$4,766,078
Nate Robinson	GSW	PG	1192	0.095	1.7	$3,407,662	$5,199,604	$4,131,952	$4,246,406
Andris Biedrins	GSW	C	739	0.090	1.0	$2,174,844	$4,893,604	$2,410,916	$3,159,788
Keith Benson	GSW	C	9	0.066	0.0	$486,513	$3,227,604	$19,366	$1,244,494
Kwame Brown	GSW	C	187	0.034	0.0	$533,210	$1,085,604	$135,339	$584,718
Klay Thompson	GSW	SF	1608	0.022	-0.1	$274,279	$235,604	$252,567	$254,150
Charles Jenkins	GSW	PG	893	0.013	-0.2	$94,079	-$342,396	-$203,840	-$150,719
Mikki Moore	GSW	C	118	-0.038	-0.2	$210,317	-$3,810,396	-$299,751	-$1,299,944
Jeremy Tyler	GSW	C	568	-0.069	-1.1	-$1,407,304	-$5,884,396	-$2,228,225	-$3,173,308
Earl Barron	GSW	C	9	-0.206	0.0	$399,973	-$15,234,396	-$91,406	-$4,975,277
Ekpe Udoh	GSW-MIL	PF	1290	0.078	1.4	$2,895,042	$4,077,604	$3,506,739	$3,493,128
Monta Ellis	GSW-MIL	SG	2120	0.043	0.8	$1,787,562	$1,663,604	$2,351,227	$1,934,131
Ishmael Smith	GSW-ORL	PG	234	0.074	0.2	$879,692	$3,805,604	$593,674	$1,759,657
Kyle Lowry	HOU	PG	1510	0.173	4.7	$8,388,521	$10,537,604	$10,607,855	$9,844,660
Goran Dragic	HOU	PG	1752	0.147	4.5	$8,043,704	$8,769,604	$10,242,897	$9,018,735
Samuel Dalembert	HOU	C	1446	0.159	4.0	$7,336,079	$9,585,604	$9,240,522	$8,720,735
Chase Budinger	HOU	SF	1298	0.122	2.6	$4,932,775	$7,069,604	$6,117,564	$6,039,981
Chandler Parsons	HOU	F	1894	0.099	2.9	$5,437,462	$5,505,604	$6,951,743	$5,964,936
Courtney Lee	HOU	SG	1757	0.093	2.5	$4,705,046	$5,097,604	$5,970,993	$5,257,881
Kevin Martin	HOU	SG	1264	0.101	2.0	$3,875,871	$5,641,604	$4,753,992	$4,757,155
Greg Smith	HOU	C	69	0.162	0.2	$808,398	$9,789,604	$450,322	$3,682,775
Jeff Adrien	HOU	PF	63	0.084	0.1	$604,132	$4,451,604	$186,967	$1,747,568
Luis Scola	HOU	PF	2067	0.033	0.3	$1,022,651	$983,604	$1,355,406	$1,120,554
Patrick Patterson	HOU	PF	1483	0.027	0.0	$552,388	$575,604	$569,080	$565,691
Earl Boykins	HOU	PG	111	-0.006	-0.1	$353,701	-$1,600,396	-$118,429	-$455,041
Marcus Morris	HOU	PF	126	-0.192	-0.6	-$492,527	-$14,248,396	-$1,196,865	-$5,312,596
Jordan Hill	HOU-LAL	PF	551	0.149	1.4	$2,893,412	$8,905,604	$3,271,325	$5,023,447
Hasheem Thabeet	HOU-POR	C	139	0.121	0.3	$943,743	$6,967,604	$645,665	$2,852,337
Jonny Flynn	HOU-POR	PG	416	-0.002	-0.2	$83,171	-$1,328,396	-$368,408	-$537,878
Terrence Williams	HOU-SAC	SF	550	0.044	0.2	$833,969	$1,731,604	$634,921	$1,066,831
Paul George	IND	SF	1958	0.171	5.9	$10,563,423	$10,367,604	$13,533,179	$11,488,069
Roy Hibbert	IND	C	1937	0.158	5.3	$9,563,380	$9,483,604	$12,246,494	$10,431,159
Kyrylo Fesenko	IND	C	17	0.459	0.2	$734,908	$29,985,604	$339,837	$10,353,450
Danny Granger	IND	SF	2062	0.134	4.7	$8,433,783	$7,885,604	$10,840,077	$9,053,155
David West	IND	PF	1925	0.136	4.5	$8,041,260	$8,021,604	$10,294,392	$8,785,752
George Hill	IND	PG	1275	0.161	3.6	$6,592,276	$9,687,604	$8,234,463	$8,171,448
Darren Collison	IND	PG	1877	0.110	3.3	$6,090,918	$6,219,604	$7,782,798	$6,697,773
Tyler Hansbrough	IND	PF	1442	0.088	1.9	$3,691,067	$4,757,604	$4,573,643	$4,340,771
Jeff Foster	IND	C	141	0.156	0.4	$1,125,288	$9,347,604	$878,675	$3,783,856
Dahntay Jones	IND	SG	1052	0.084	1.3	$2,671,846	$4,485,604	$3,145,904	$3,434,451
Jeff Pendergraph	IND	PF	106	0.110	0.2	$792,708	$6,253,604	$441,921	$2,496,078
Louis Amundson	IND	PF	753	0.073	0.7	$1,740,370	$3,703,604	$1,859,209	$2,434,394
A.J. Price	IND	PG	568	0.063	0.4	$1,238,037	$3,057,604	$1,157,813	$1,817,818
Lance Stephenson	IND	SG	442	-0.012	-0.3	-$97,773	-$2,008,396	-$591,807	-$899,325
Chris Paul	LAC	PG	2180	0.296	12.3	$21,397,062	$18,901,604	$27,470,331	$22,589,666
Blake Griffin	LAC	PF	2392	0.186	8.0	$14,070,629	$11,387,604	$18,159,433	$14,539,222
DeAndre Jordan	LAC	C	1798	0.193	6.3	$11,139,864	$11,863,604	$14,220,507	$12,407,992
Reggie Evans	LAC	PF	771	0.136	1.8	$3,490,945	$7,987,604	$4,105,628	$5,194,726
Randy Foye	LAC	SG	1682	0.077	1.8	$3,541,502	$3,975,604	$4,457,977	$3,991,694
Chauncey Billups	LAC	PG	607	0.090	0.8	$1,870,969	$4,893,604	$1,980,278	$2,914,950
Mo Williams	LAC	PG	1472	0.059	1.0	$2,220,071	$2,751,604	$2,700,241	$2,557,305
Travis Leslie	LAC	G/F	45	0.094	0.1	$583,573	$5,165,604	$154,968	$1,968,048
Kenyon Martin	LAC	PF	940	0.044	0.4	$1,089,500	$1,731,604	$1,085,139	$1,302,081
Caron Butler	LAC	SF	1871	0.034	0.3	$1,036,853	$1,051,604	$1,311,701	$1,133,386
Eric Beldsoe	LAC	PG	463	0.031	0.1	$571,992	$881,604	$272,122	$575,239
Bobby Simmons	LAC	SF	418	0.030	0.0	$547,625	$813,604	$226,724	$529,318
Ryan Gomes	LAC	SF	425	-0.022	-0.4	-$226,318	-$2,688,396	-$761,712	-$1,225,475
Trey Thompkins	LAC	PF	119	-0.072	-0.2	$64,789	-$6,122,396	-$485,710	-$2,181,106
Courtney Fortson	LAC-HOU	G	95	-0.017	-0.1	$332,292	-$2,382,396	-$150,885	-$733,663
Solomon Jones	LAC-NOH	PF	292	0.034	0.1	$566,679	$1,085,604	$211,331	$621,205
Brian Cook	LAC-WAS	PF	276	0.075	0.3	$962,354	$3,873,604	$712,743	$1,849,567
Andrew Bynum	LAL	C	2112	0.196	7.5	$13,227,004	$12,067,604	$16,991,186	$14,095,265
Pau Gasol	LAL	C	2430	0.154	6.5	$11,575,667	$9,245,604	$14,977,878	$11,933,050
Matt Barnes	LAL	SF	1440	0.180	4.6	$8,353,104	$10,979,604	$10,540,420	$9,957,709
Kobe Bryant	LAL	SG	2232	0.090	3.0	$5,572,329	$4,859,604	$7,231,091	$5,887,675
Josh McRoberts	LAL	PF	718	0.116	1.4	$2,787,658	$6,661,604	$3,188,688	$4,212,650
Troy Murphy	LAL	PF	956	0.083	1.1	$2,420,458	$4,383,604	$2,793,817	$3,199,293
Metta World Peace	LAL	F	1720	0.059	1.2	$2,544,771	$2,785,604	$3,194,159	$2,841,511
Steve Blake	LAL	PG	1237	0.037	0.3	$977,424	$1,255,604	$1,035,455	$1,089,494
Devin Ebanks	LAL	PF	396	0.006	-0.2	$200,117	-$852,396	-$225,033	-$292,437
Jason Kapono	LAL	SF	269	-0.015	-0.2	$97,284	-$2,212,396	-$396,756	-$837,289
Darius Morris	LAL	G	169	-0.068	-0.3	-$80,047	-$5,816,396	-$655,314	-$2,183,919
Andrew Goudelock	LAL	PG	419	-0.060	-0.7	-$780,341	-$5,272,396	-$1,472,756	-$2,508,498
Luke Walton	LAL-CLE	SF	364	-0.045	-0.5	-$428,813	-$4,286,396	-$1,040,165	-$1,918,458
Derek Fisher	LAL-OKC	PG	1508	0.021	-0.1	$259,971	$201,604	$202,679	$221,418
Marc Gasol	MEM	C	2370	0.149	6.1	$10,881,854	$8,905,604	$14,070,854	$11,286,104
Mike Conley	MEM	PG	2174	0.156	5.9	$10,560,058	$9,381,604	$13,597,071	$11,179,578
Rudy Gay	MEM	SF	2422	0.120	4.8	$8,579,735	$6,899,604	$11,140,561	$8,873,300
Tony Allen	MEM	PG	1525	0.154	4.1	$7,440,948	$9,245,604	$9,399,697	$8,695,416
Dante Cunningham	MEM	PF	1124	0.165	3.3	$6,026,867	$9,959,604	$7,463,063	$7,816,511
Zach Randolph	MEM	PF	735	0.144	1.8	$3,558,307	$8,531,604	$4,180,486	$5,423,466
O.J. Mayo	MEM	SG	1771	0.083	2.1	$4,111,533	$4,417,604	$5,215,718	$4,581,618
Hamed Haddadi	MEM	C	206	0.151	0.5	$1,389,231	$9,007,604	$1,237,044	$3,877,960
Quincy Pondexter	MEM	SF	1002	0.086	1.3	$2,638,342	$4,621,604	$3,087,231	$3,449,059
Josh Davis	MEM	PF	130	0.129	0.3	$950,135	$7,511,604	$651,006	$3,037,582
Marreese Speights	MEM	C	1345	0.060	1.0	$2,117,026	$2,819,604	$2,528,245	$2,488,292
Gilbert Arenas	MEM	SG	211	0.060	0.2	$735,156	$2,853,604	$401,407	$1,330,056
Josh Selby	MEM	PG	237	-0.149	-0.9	-$982,712	-$11,324,396	-$1,789,255	-$4,698,787
Jeremy Pargo	MEM	PG	424	-0.138	-1.4	-$1,966,604	-$10,576,396	-$2,989,595	-$5,177,532
Brian Skinner	MEM	PF	4	-0.459	0.0	$405,108	-$32,404,396	-$86,412	-$10,695,233
Sam Young	MEM-PHI	SF	375	0.029	0.0	$526,729	$745,604	$186,401	$486,245
LeBron James	MIA	SF	2326	0.328	14.7	$25,434,492	$21,077,604	$32,684,338	$26,398,811
Dwayne Wade	MIA	SG	1625	0.237	7.2	$12,674,646	$14,889,604	$16,130,404	$14,564,885
Chris Bosh	MIA	PF	2007	0.136	4.6	$8,328,082	$7,987,604	$10,687,414	$9,001,033
Shane Battier	MIA	SF	1499	0.126	3.1	$5,809,107	$7,307,604	$7,302,732	$6,806,481
Mario Chalmers	MIA	PG	1825	0.113	3.3	$6,129,203	$6,423,604	$7,815,385	$6,789,397
Joel Anthony	MIA	C	1349	0.128	2.9	$5,370,755	$7,443,604	$6,694,281	$6,502,880
Udonis Haslem	MIA	PF	1589	0.114	2.9	$5,482,264	$6,525,604	$6,912,790	$6,306,886
Mike Miller	MIA	SG	752	0.140	1.8	$3,536,437	$8,293,604	$4,157,860	$5,329,300
James Jones	MIA	SG	666	0.124	1.4	$2,808,767	$7,205,604	$3,199,288	$4,404,553
Dexter Pittman	MIA	C	301	0.019	0.0	$409,642	$65,604	$13,165	$162,803
Terrel Harris	MIA	SG	318	0.016	-0.1	$366,610	-$172,396	-$36,548	$52,555
Juwan Howard	MIA	PF	190	-0.106	-0.5	-$404,552	-$8,400,396	-$1,064,050	-$3,289,666
Norris Cole	MIA	PG	1260	-0.054	-2.1	-$3,051,771	-$4,898,396	-$4,114,653	-$4,021,607
Eddy Curry	MIA	C	83	-0.170	-0.3	-$99,615	-$12,786,396	-$707,514	-$4,531,175
Mickell Gladness	MIA-GSW	C	252	0.008	-0.1	$321,879	-$682,396	-$114,643	-$158,387
Ersan Ilyasova	MIL	PF	1655	0.218	6.7	$11,786,219	$13,597,604	$15,002,690	$13,462,171
Mike Dunleavy	MIL	SG	1445	0.167	4.3	$7,740,750	$10,129,604	$9,758,185	$9,209,513
Brandon Jennings	MIL	PG	2331	0.100	3.6	$6,624,045	$5,539,604	$8,608,545	$6,924,064
Luc Mbah a Moute	MIL	PF	1009	0.121	2.0	$3,904,204	$7,001,604	$4,709,746	$5,205,185
Carlos Delfino	MIL	SF	1537	0.091	2.1	$4,039,124	$4,927,604	$5,049,152	$4,671,960
Drew Gooden	MIL	C	1469	0.079	1.7	$3,283,067	$4,145,604	$4,059,928	$3,829,533
Jon Leuer	MIL	PF	555	0.109	1.0	$2,114,901	$6,151,604	$2,276,093	$3,514,199
Beno Udrih	MIL	PG	1080	0.072	1.1	$2,271,354	$3,669,604	$2,642,115	$2,861,024
Shaun Livingston	MIL	PG	1092	0.068	1.0	$2,117,292	$3,363,604	$2,448,704	$2,643,200
Larry Sanders	MIL	PF	643	0.075	0.7	$1,600,863	$3,839,604	$1,645,910	$2,362,126
Tobias Harris	MIL	F	479	0.079	0.5	$1,389,692	$4,145,604	$1,323,830	$2,286,375
Andrew Bogut	MIL	C	364	0.047	0.2	$757,221	$1,969,604	$477,957	$1,068,261
Jon Brockman	MIL	PF	239	0.037	0.1	$575,179	$1,289,604	$205,477	$690,087
Darington Hobson	MIL	G	39	-0.281	-0.2	$50,941	-$20,334,396	-$528,694	-$6,937,383
Stephen Jackson	MIL-SAS	SG	1212	0.020	-0.1	$258,979	$133,604	$107,952	$166,845
Kevin Love	MIN	PF	2145	0.225	8.9	$15,629,370	$14,039,604	$20,076,634	$16,581,869
Nikola Pekovic	MIN	PF	1264	0.207	4.8	$8,598,754	$12,815,604	$10,799,282	$10,737,880
Ricky Rubio	MIN	PG	1404	0.101	2.2	$4,227,842	$5,607,604	$5,248,717	$5,028,054
Luke Ridnour	MIN	PG	1750	0.084	2.2	$4,130,375	$4,485,604	$5,233,205	$4,616,395
Martell Webster	MIN	SF	1140	0.081	1.3	$2,714,417	$4,247,604	$3,228,179	$3,396,733
Anthony Randolph	MIN	PF	517	0.089	0.7	$1,636,315	$4,791,604	$1,651,506	$2,693,142
Jose Barea	MIN	SG	1032	0.059	0.7	$1,698,029	$2,751,604	$1,893,104	$2,114,246
Derrick Williams	MIN	F	1418	0.052	0.8	$1,804,456	$2,275,604	$2,151,204	$2,077,088
Wayne Ellington	MIN	SG	973	0.042	0.3	$1,042,201	$1,595,604	$1,035,015	$1,224,273
Brad Miller	MIN	C	146	0.038	0.0	$540,825	$1,357,604	$132,140	$676,856
Malcolm Lee	MIN	G	243	0.034	0.0	$546,757	$1,051,604	$170,360	$589,574
Wesley Johnson	MIN	SF	1469	0.020	-0.2	$187,455	$99,604	$97,546	$128,202
Anthony Tolliver	MIN	C	882	0.014	-0.2	$129,992	-$274,396	-$161,345	-$101,916
Michael Beasley	MIN	SF	1087	0.004	-0.5	-$334,852	-$954,396	-$691,619	-$660,289
Darko Milicic	MIN	C	472	-0.034	-0.6	-$512,679	-$3,538,396	-$1,113,415	-$1,721,497
Kris Humphries	NJN	PF	2159	0.149	5.6	$9,955,212	$8,905,604	$12,818,133	$10,559,650
Jordan Williams	NJN	F	635	0.145	1.6	$3,172,354	$8,633,604	$3,654,892	$5,153,617
Shelden Williams	NJN	C	1276	0.102	2.0	$3,953,362	$5,709,604	$4,856,970	$4,839,979
Deron Williams	NJN	PG	1995	0.080	2.3	$4,324,370	$4,179,604	$5,558,873	$4,687,616
Jordan Farmar	NJN	PG	831	0.096	1.2	$2,563,223	$5,301,604	$2,937,089	$3,600,638
Andre Emmett	NJN	SG	45	0.157	0.1	$683,979	$9,449,604	$283,488	$3,472,357
Sundiata Gaines	NJN	PG	793	0.072	0.8	$1,793,619	$3,669,604	$1,939,997	$2,467,740
Gerald Green	NJN	SF	781	0.064	0.6	$1,552,360	$3,125,604	$1,627,398	$2,101,787
Anthony Morrow	NJN	SG	1636	0.040	0.5	$1,313,758	$1,459,604	$1,591,941	$1,455,101
Larry Owens	NJN	SF	75	0.041	0.0	$516,104	$1,561,604	$78,080	$718,596
MarShon Brooks	NJN	SG	1648	0.026	0.0	$502,787	$507,604	$557,688	$522,693
Jerry Smith	NJN	G	46	0.009	0.0	$446,723	-$648,396	-$19,884	-$73,852
Brook Lopez	NJN	C	136	0.007	-0.1	$386,904	-$750,396	-$68,036	-$143,843
Dennis Horner	NJN	F	22	0.002	0.0	$455,683	-$1,090,396	-$15,992	-$216,902
Damion James	NJN	SF	173	-0.013	-0.1	$240,775	-$2,110,396	-$243,399	-$704,340
Johan Petro	NJN	C	924	0.001	-0.5	-$311,796	-$1,158,396	-$713,572	-$727,921
Keith Bogans	NJN	SG	94	-0.018	-0.1	$332,114	-$2,416,396	-$151,427	-$745,236
DeShawn Stevenson	NJN	SF	960	-0.010	-0.7	-$716,396	-$1,906,396	-$1,220,093	-$1,280,962
Mehmet Okur	NJN	C	453	-0.054	-0.7	-$785,830	-$4,864,396	-$1,469,048	-$2,373,091
Shawne Williams	NJN	PF	516	-0.091	-1.2	-$1,646,296	-$7,414,396	-$2,550,552	-$3,870,415
Gustavo Ayon	NOH	C	1088	0.157	3.0	$5,540,737	$9,415,604	$6,829,451	$7,261,931
Jarrett Jack	NOH	PG	1530	0.112	2.8	$5,160,823	$6,355,604	$6,482,716	$5,999,714
Trevor Ariza	NOH	SF	1350	0.108	2.3	$4,418,135	$6,083,604	$5,475,244	$5,325,661
Greivis Vasquez	NOH	SG	1705	0.088	2.2	$4,247,693	$4,723,604	$5,369,163	$4,780,153
Carl Landry	NOH	PF	999	0.113	1.8	$3,569,463	$6,423,604	$4,278,120	$4,757,063
Emeka Okafor	NOH	C	781	0.106	1.3	$2,714,098	$5,981,604	$3,114,422	$3,936,708
Al-Farouq Aminu	NOH	SF	1477	0.076	1.6	$3,141,435	$3,941,604	$3,881,166	$3,654,735
Marco Belinelli	NOH	SG	1966	0.061	1.5	$2,945,439	$2,887,604	$3,784,686	$3,205,910
Jason Smith	NOH	C	947	0.079	1.1	$2,267,972	$4,111,604	$2,595,793	$2,991,789
Lance Thomas	NOH	F	629	0.090	0.8	$1,910,476	$4,859,604	$2,037,794	$2,935,958
Trey Johnson	NOH	SG	61	0.115	0.1	$668,042	$6,593,604	$268,140	$2,509,928
Eric Gordon	NOH	SG	310	0.090	0.4	$1,187,250	$4,893,604	$1,011,345	$2,364,066
Darryl Watkins	NOH	C	98	0.069	0.1	$624,585	$3,431,604	$224,198	$1,426,796
Xavier Henry	NOH	SG	759	0.019	-0.1	$298,876	$31,604	$15,992	$115,490
DaJuan Summers	NOH	SF	209	0.013	-0.1	$381,078	-$376,396	-$52,445	-$15,921
Jerome Dyson	NOH	G	180	0.009	-0.1	$371,604	-$614,396	-$73,728	-$105,507
Carldell Johnson	NOH	G	119	-0.009	-0.1	$330,308	-$1,838,396	-$145,846	-$551,311
Chris Kaman	NOH	C	1372	-0.010	-1.0	-$1,227,104	-$1,906,396	-$1,743,717	-$1,625,739
Jeff Foote	NOH	C	39	-0.146	-0.1	$237,410	-$11,154,396	-$290,014	-$3,735,667
Tyson Chandler	NYK	C	2061	0.266	10.3	$18,028,601	$16,827,604	$23,121,128	$19,325,778
Carmelo Anthony	NYK	SF	1876	0.132	4.2	$7,582,862	$7,749,604	$9,692,171	$8,341,546
Landry Fields	NYK	SG	1894	0.128	4.0	$7,349,219	$7,443,604	$9,398,791	$8,063,871
Steve Novak	NYK	PF	1020	0.162	2.9	$5,422,729	$9,789,604	$6,656,931	$7,289,755
Jeremy Lin	NYK	PG	940	0.136	2.2	$4,152,333	$7,987,604	$5,005,565	$5,715,167
Jerome Jordan	NYK	C	108	0.203	0.4	$1,152,542	$12,543,604	$903,139	$4,866,428
J.R. Smith	NYK	SF	967	0.115	1.8	$3,555,917	$6,593,604	$4,250,677	$4,800,066
Josh Harrellson	NYK	C	540	0.136	1.2	$2,596,479	$8,021,604	$2,887,777	$4,501,953
Jared Jeffries	NYK	PF	729	0.117	1.4	$2,836,020	$6,695,604	$3,254,064	$4,261,896
Renaldo Balkman	NYK	SF	115	0.175	0.4	$1,082,505	$10,639,604	$815,703	$4,179,271
Amare Stoudemire	NYK	C	1543	0.082	1.8	$3,588,535	$4,349,604	$4,474,293	$4,137,477
Iman Shumpert	NYK	PG	1705	0.059	1.2	$2,496,515	$2,751,604	$3,127,657	$2,791,925
Mike Bibby	NYK	PG	557	0.064	0.4	$1,233,097	$3,091,604	$1,148,016	$1,824,239
Bill Walker	NYK	SF	620	0.049	0.3	$989,625	$2,071,604	$856,263	$1,305,831
Baron Davis	NYK	PG	595	0.009	-0.2	$125,901	-$648,396	-$257,197	-$259,897
Toney Douglas	NYK	SG	656	-0.082	-1.5	-$2,000,746	-$6,768,396	-$2,960,045	-$3,909,729
Dan Gadzuric	NYK	C	13	-0.201	-0.1	$369,780	-$14,860,396	-$128,790	-$4,873,135
Kevin Durant	OKC	SF	2546	0.228	10.8	$18,778,283	$14,277,604	$24,233,853	$19,096,580
James Harden	OKC	SG	1946	0.247	9.0	$15,739,569	$15,535,604	$20,154,857	$17,143,343
Serge Ibaka	OKC	PF	1792	0.215	7.1	$12,532,271	$13,393,604	$16,000,892	$13,975,589
Russell Westbrook	OKC	PG	2331	0.133	5.2	$9,348,401	$7,783,604	$12,095,721	$9,742,575
Nick Collison	OKC	C	1307	0.127	2.8	$5,195,142	$7,409,604	$6,456,235	$6,353,660
Thabo Sefolosha	OKC	SG	914	0.134	2.1	$3,985,839	$7,851,604	$4,784,244	$5,540,562
Cole Aldrich	OKC	C	173	0.193	0.6	$1,502,954	$11,897,604	$1,372,190	$4,924,249
Ryan Reid	OKC	F	17	0.169	0.1	$560,304	$10,265,604	$116,344	$3,647,417
Daequan Cook	OKC	SG	989	0.075	1.0	$2,224,958	$3,873,604	$2,553,996	$2,884,186
Kendrick Perkins	OKC	C	1744	0.048	0.8	$1,863,354	$2,003,604	$2,329,524	$2,065,494
Nazr Mohammed	OKC	C	692	0.066	0.6	$1,466,192	$3,227,604	$1,489,001	$2,060,932
Eric Maynor	OKC	PG	137	0.011	0.0	$403,249	-$512,396	-$46,799	-$51,982
Royal Ivey	OKC	PG	354	-0.005	-0.2	$103,748	-$1,532,396	-$361,645	-$596,765
Reggie Jackson	OKC	PG	501	-0.009	-0.4	-$129,684	-$1,838,396	-$614,024	-$860,701
Lazar Hayward	OKC	SG	141	-0.081	-0.3	-$53,237	-$6,700,396	-$629,837	-$2,461,157
Ryan Anderson	ORL	PF	1964	0.224	8.1	$14,280,933	$13,971,604	$18,293,487	$15,515,341
Dwight Howard	ORL	C	2070	0.211	8.0	$14,109,729	$13,121,604	$18,107,814	$15,113,049
J.J. Redick	ORL	SG	1765	0.139	4.2	$7,599,792	$8,225,604	$9,678,794	$8,501,397
Jason Richardson	ORL	SG	1591	0.090	2.1	$4,108,045	$4,859,604	$5,154,420	$4,707,356
Jameer Nelson	ORL	PG	1706	0.085	2.1	$4,068,644	$4,519,604	$5,140,296	$4,576,181
Daniel Orton	ORL	PF	187	0.141	0.4	$1,238,551	$8,327,604	$1,038,175	$3,534,777
Quentin Richardson	ORL	SG	866	0.089	1.1	$2,421,202	$4,791,604	$2,766,353	$3,326,386
Chris Duhon	ORL	PG	1226	0.069	1.1	$2,362,410	$3,431,604	$2,804,764	$2,866,260
Hedo Turkoglu	ORL	SF	1653	0.056	1.1	$2,259,188	$2,547,604	$2,807,460	$2,538,084
Von Wafer	ORL	SG	469	0.034	0.1	$614,793	$1,051,604	$328,802	$665,066
DeAndre Liggins	ORL	G	115	0.028	0.0	$485,823	$677,604	$51,950	$405,125
Earl Clark	ORL	PF	559	0.007	-0.2	$117,242	-$750,396	-$279,648	-$304,267
Glen Davis	ORL	C	1427	0.010	-0.5	-$309,760	-$580,396	-$552,150	-$480,769
Justin Harper	ORL	PF	84	-0.209	-0.4	-$221,059	-$15,404,396	-$862,646	-$5,496,034
Larry Hughes	ORL	SG	114	-0.227	-0.6	-$543,846	-$16,662,396	-$1,266,342	-$6,157,528
Andre Iguodala	PHI	SF	2209	0.207	8.4	$14,673,332	$12,815,604	$18,873,113	$15,454,016
Elton Brand	PHI	PF	1732	0.173	5.3	$9,521,500	$10,503,604	$12,128,161	$10,717,755
Thaddeus Young	PHI	PF	1755	0.152	4.6	$8,367,448	$9,109,604	$10,658,237	$9,378,429
Louis Williams	PHI	PG	1682	0.138	4.0	$7,205,108	$8,157,604	$9,147,393	$8,170,035
Jodie Meeks	PHI	SG	1644	0.123	3.4	$6,179,654	$7,137,604	$7,822,814	$7,046,691
Spencer Hawes	PHI	C	920	0.146	2.3	$4,399,896	$8,667,604	$5,316,130	$6,127,877
Jrue Holliday	PHI	PG	2196	0.086	2.8	$5,178,992	$4,587,604	$6,716,252	$5,494,283
Lavoy Allen	PHI	F	624	0.144	1.5	$3,092,454	$8,531,604	$3,549,147	$5,057,735
Evan Turner	PHI	SG	1713	0.090	2.3	$4,386,738	$4,859,604	$5,549,668	$4,932,003
Nikola Vucevic	PHI	PF	812	0.103	1.3	$2,702,375	$5,743,604	$3,109,204	$3,851,728
Tony Battie	PHI	C	295	0.049	0.1	$724,354	$2,105,604	$414,102	$1,081,353
Francisco Elson	PHI	C	16	-0.044	0.0	$434,504	-$4,218,396	-$44,996	-$1,276,296
Craig Brackins	PHI	PF	88	-0.134	-0.3	-$20,388	-$10,304,396	-$604,525	-$3,643,103
Andres Nocioni	PHI	SF	56	-0.173	-0.2	$80,904	-$12,990,396	-$484,975	-$4,464,822
Xavier Silas	PHI	G	39	-0.217	-0.2	$140,032	-$15,948,396	-$414,658	-$5,407,674
Steve Nash	PHX	PG	1961	0.202	7.2	$12,766,623	$12,509,604	$16,354,222	$13,876,816
Marcin Gortat	PHX	C	2114	0.181	6.9	$12,153,454	$11,081,604	$15,617,674	$12,950,911
Jared Dudley	PHX	SF	2020	0.142	4.9	$8,808,208	$8,395,604	$11,306,080	$9,503,297
Josh Childress	PHX	SG	491	0.156	1.3	$2,742,945	$9,347,604	$3,059,782	$5,050,110
Channing Frye	PHX	PF	1669	0.082	2.0	$3,842,898	$4,349,604	$4,839,659	$4,344,054
Robin Lopez	PHX	C	895	0.080	1.0	$2,216,989	$4,213,604	$2,514,117	$2,981,570
Grant Hill	PHX	SF	1378	0.051	0.7	$1,742,512	$2,241,604	$2,059,287	$2,014,468
Shannon Brown	PHX	SG	1400	0.046	0.6	$1,514,854	$1,901,604	$1,774,830	$1,730,429
Sebastian Telfair	PHX	PG	895	0.024	0.0	$426,057	$371,604	$221,724	$339,795
Ronnie Price	PHX	SG	517	0.017	-0.1	$327,121	-$70,396	-$24,263	$77,487
Markieff Morris	PHX	PF	1227	0.018	-0.2	$169,410	-$2,396	-$1,960	$55,018
Michael Redd	PHX	SG	770	0.017	-0.1	$241,802	-$104,396	-$53,590	$27,939
Hakim Warrick	PHX	PF	503	0.002	-0.2	$54,961	-$1,124,396	-$377,047	-$482,161
LaMarcus Aldridge	POR	PF	1994	0.147	5.1	$9,089,346	$8,769,604	$11,657,727	$9,838,892
Nicolas Batum	POR	SF	1791	0.148	4.6	$8,243,932	$8,803,604	$10,511,503	$9,186,346
Wesley Matthews	POR	SG	2228	0.111	4.0	$7,259,721	$6,321,604	$9,389,689	$7,657,005
Craig Smith	POR	PF	464	0.115	0.9	$1,944,387	$6,559,604	$2,029,104	$3,511,032
Elliot Williams	POR	SG	149	0.100	0.2	$869,385	$5,573,604	$553,645	$2,332,211
Luke Babbitt	POR	SF	537	0.072	0.5	$1,357,976	$3,635,604	$1,301,546	$2,098,375
Raymond Felton	POR	PG	1906	0.044	0.7	$1,722,431	$1,731,604	$2,200,291	$1,884,776
Jamal Crawford	POR	SG	1613	0.045	0.7	$1,616,146	$1,833,604	$1,971,736	$1,807,162
Kurt Thomas	POR	C	803	0.045	0.3	$1,042,396	$1,833,604	$981,589	$1,285,863
Joel Pryzbilla	POR	C	449	0.037	0.1	$664,429	$1,289,604	$386,021	$780,018
Nolan Smith	POR	PG	541	-0.059	-0.9	-$1,126,291	-$5,204,396	-$1,877,052	-$2,735,913
Marcus Camby	POR-HOU	C	1352	0.196	4.8	$8,661,654	$12,101,604	$10,907,579	$10,556,946
Gerald Wallace	POR-NJN	SF	2076	0.142	5.1	$9,076,029	$8,429,604	$11,666,572	$9,724,068
Armon Johnson	POR-NJN	PG	124	0.038	0.0	$528,500	$1,323,604	$109,418	$653,841
Chris Johnson	POR-NOH	C	175	0.024	0.0	$464,307	$371,604	$43,354	$293,088
Jason Thompson	SAC	PF	1657	0.144	4.1	$7,427,826	$8,531,604	$9,424,579	$8,461,336
Isaiah Thomas	SAC	PG	1655	0.132	3.7	$6,745,364	$7,749,604	$8,550,396	$7,681,788
Marcus Thornton	SAC	SG	1780	0.101	2.8	$5,233,250	$5,607,604	$6,654,357	$5,831,737
DeMarcus Cousins	SAC	C	1950	0.079	2.2	$4,202,979	$4,145,604	$5,389,285	$4,579,289
Tyreke Evans	SAC	SG	2162	0.071	2.1	$3,995,862	$3,601,604	$5,191,112	$4,262,859
Hassan Whiteside	SAC	C	109	0.136	0.3	$900,180	$7,987,604	$580,433	$3,156,072
Francisco Garcia	SAC	SF	798	0.051	0.4	$1,194,298	$2,207,604	$1,174,445	$1,525,449
Donte Greene	SAC	SF	777	0.036	0.2	$776,310	$1,221,604	$632,791	$876,902
Tyler Honeycutt	SAC	SF	88	0.046	0.0	$537,496	$1,867,604	$109,566	$838,222
Chuck Hayes	SAC	C	1039	0.028	0.1	$583,998	$677,604	$469,354	$576,985
John Salmons	SAC	SG	1250	0.026	0.0	$517,875	$541,604	$451,337	$503,605
Travis Outlaw	SAC	SF	500	-0.025	-0.5	-$402,959	-$2,892,396	-$964,132	-$1,419,829
Jimmer Fredette	SAC	PG	1135	-0.027	-1.2	-$1,596,589	-$3,028,396	-$2,291,486	-$2,305,490
J.J. Hickson	SAC-POR	C	1244	0.067	1.1	$2,302,025	$3,295,604	$2,733,154	$2,776,928
Kawhi Leonard	SAS	SF	1534	0.228	6.5	$11,475,260	$14,243,604	$14,566,459	$13,428,441
Manu Ginobli	SAS	SF	792	0.281	4.2	$7,640,379	$17,847,604	$9,423,535	$11,637,173
Tony Parker	SAS	PG	1923	0.156	5.2	$9,361,470	$9,347,604	$11,983,628	$10,230,901
Tim Duncan	SAS	C	1634	0.158	4.5	$8,141,489	$9,483,604	$10,330,806	$9,318,633
Tiago Splitter	SAS	C	1121	0.190	3.9	$7,024,448	$11,693,604	$8,739,020	$9,152,357
Danny Green	SAS	SF	1522	0.159	4.2	$7,696,762	$9,585,604	$9,726,193	$9,002,853
Matt Bonner	SAS	PF	1326	0.131	2.9	$5,428,148	$7,647,604	$6,760,482	$6,612,078
DeJuan Blair	SAS	C	1363	0.116	2.6	$4,866,439	$6,661,604	$6,053,178	$5,860,407
Derrick Byars	SAS	F	37	0.184	0.1	$681,960	$11,285,604	$278,378	$4,081,981
Patrick Mills	SAS	PG	261	0.145	0.7	$1,582,854	$8,633,604	$1,502,247	$3,906,235
Gary Neal	SAS	SG	1206	0.085	1.5	$3,036,354	$4,553,604	$3,661,098	$3,750,352
Eric Dawson	SAS	F	39	0.130	0.1	$617,945	$7,579,604	$197,070	$2,798,206
T.J. Ford	SAS	PG	191	0.048	0.1	$629,189	$2,037,604	$259,455	$975,416
James Anderson	SAS	SG	603	0.035	0.1	$676,488	$1,119,604	$450,081	$748,724
Malcolm Thomas	SAS	F	15	0.015	0.0	$468,292	-$206,396	-$2,064	$86,611
Cory Joseph	SAS	PG	266	-0.023	-0.3	$21,404	-$2,790,396	-$494,830	-$1,087,941
Ike Diogu	SAS	PF	14	-0.210	-0.1	$357,331	-$15,472,396	-$144,409	-$5,086,491
Richard Jefferson	SAS-GSW	SF	1748	0.084	2.1	$4,126,196	$4,485,604	$5,227,224	$4,613,008
Justin Dentmon	SAS-TOR	G	91	-0.091	-0.2	$101,357	-$7,380,396	-$447,744	-$2,575,594
Jose Calderon	TOR	PG	1799	0.172	5.5	$9,839,648	$10,469,604	$12,556,545	$10,955,266
Ed Davis	TOR	PF	1534	0.161	4.3	$7,835,206	$9,687,604	$9,907,190	$9,143,333
Amir Johnson	TOR	PF	1553	0.155	4.2	$7,623,875	$9,313,604	$9,642,685	$8,860,055
Jerryd Bayless	TOR	PG	705	0.117	1.3	$2,758,245	$6,695,604	$3,146,934	$4,200,261
Aaron Gray	TOR	C	813	0.101	1.3	$2,647,532	$5,607,604	$3,039,321	$3,764,819
James Johnson	TOR	PF	1561	0.070	1.5	$2,961,448	$3,533,604	$3,677,304	$3,390,785
Solomon Alabi	TOR	C	122	0.120	0.2	$884,083	$6,933,604	$563,933	$2,793,873
Linas Kleiza	TOR	SF	1057	0.051	0.6	$1,446,925	$2,241,604	$1,579,584	$1,756,037
Gary Forbes	TOR	SF	713	0.045	0.3	$978,646	$1,833,604	$871,573	$1,227,941
Andrea Bargnani	TOR	C	1032	0.032	0.2	$729,454	$949,604	$653,328	$777,462
Anthony Carter	TOR	PG	209	0.018	0.0	$418,088	-$36,396	-$5,071	$125,540
Alan Anderson	TOR	G/F	461	0.003	-0.2	$114,408	-$1,022,396	-$314,216	-$407,401
DeMar DeRozan	TOR	SF	2206	0.012	-0.6	-$542,075	-$410,396	-$603,556	-$518,676
Rasual Butler	TOR	SG	453	-0.026	-0.5	-$344,627	-$2,994,396	-$904,308	-$1,414,444
Jamaal Magloire	TOR	C	374	-0.035	-0.5	-$321,146	-$3,606,396	-$899,195	-$1,608,912
Leandro Barbosa	TOR-IND	SG	1382	0.033	0.2	$840,698	$983,604	$906,227	$910,176
Paul Millsap	UTA	PF	2099	0.182	6.8	$12,107,749	$11,115,604	$15,554,435	$12,925,929
Al Jefferson	UTA	C	2075	0.138	4.9	$8,777,927	$8,157,604	$11,284,686	$9,406,739
Gordon Hayward	UTA	SF	2015	0.133	4.5	$8,145,297	$7,783,604	$10,455,975	$8,794,958
Jeremy Evans	UTA	SF	217	0.294	1.2	$2,540,981	$18,765,604	$2,714,757	$8,007,114
Derrick Favors	UTA	PF	1376	0.128	3.0	$5,493,137	$7,477,604	$6,859,455	$6,610,066
Devin Harris	UTA	PG	1741	0.113	3.2	$5,868,890	$6,423,604	$7,455,663	$6,582,719
Enes Kanter	UTA	C	874	0.104	1.4	$2,918,983	$5,845,604	$3,406,039	$4,056,875
Alec Burks	UTA	SG	939	0.067	0.8	$1,853,738	$3,295,604	$2,063,048	$2,404,130
Earl Watson	UTA	PG	1032	0.062	0.8	$1,825,954	$2,989,604	$2,056,848	$2,290,802
Raja Bell	UTA	SG	796	0.064	0.6	$1,573,079	$3,125,604	$1,658,654	$2,119,112
Jamaal Tinsley	UTA	PG	507	0.010	-0.2	$204,260	-$546,396	-$184,682	-$175,606
C..J. Miles	UTA	SF	1145	0.012	-0.3	-$53,573	-$410,396	-$313,269	-$259,079
Josh Howard	UTA	SF	991	0.000	-0.5	-$403,844	-$1,226,396	-$810,239	-$813,493
Blake Ahearn	UTA	PG	30	-0.459	-0.3	-$40,646	-$32,438,396	-$648,768	-$11,042,603
Trevor Booker	WAS	PF	1262	0.140	3.0	$5,591,277	$8,259,604	$6,949,080	$6,933,320
James Singleton	WAS	PF	262	0.237	1.2	$2,440,787	$14,889,604	$2,600,717	$6,643,703
John Wall	WAS	PG	2387	0.086	3.0	$5,630,519	$4,621,604	$7,354,512	$5,868,878
Jan Vesely	WAS	F	1078	0.111	1.9	$3,737,923	$6,287,604	$4,518,691	$4,848,073
Kevin Seraphin	WAS	PF	1176	0.104	1.9	$3,763,954	$5,845,604	$4,582,954	$4,730,837
Chris Singleton	WAS	SF	1431	0.066	1.2	$2,526,195	$3,227,604	$3,079,134	$2,944,311
Cartier Martin	WAS	SF	391	0.090	0.5	$1,373,719	$4,893,604	$1,275,599	$2,514,307
Roger Mason	WAS	SG	696	0.060	0.5	$1,324,029	$2,819,604	$1,308,296	$1,817,310
Shelvin Mack	WAS	PG	778	0.052	0.4	$1,203,789	$2,275,604	$1,180,280	$1,553,224
Morris Almond	WAS	SG	67	0.061	0.1	$559,029	$2,921,604	$130,498	$1,203,710
Rashard Lewis	WAS	SF	729	0.023	0.0	$421,967	$337,604	$164,076	$307,882
Maurice Evans	WAS	SG	343	0.021	0.0	$425,012	$201,604	$46,100	$224,239
Edwin Ubiles	WAS	G	52	-0.020	0.0	$391,650	-$2,552,396	-$88,483	-$749,743
Jordan Crawford	WAS	SG	1753	0.001	-0.9	-$1,016,446	-$1,158,396	-$1,353,779	-$1,176,207
Andray Blatche	WAS	C	626	-0.059	-1.1	-$1,377,661	-$5,204,396	-$2,171,968	-$2,918,008
Hamady N’Diaye	WAS	C	3	-0.531	0.0	$414,582	-$37,300,396	-$74,601	-$12,320,138
JaVale McGee	WAS-DEN	C	1537	0.148	3.9	$7,169,160	$8,837,604	$9,055,598	$8,354,121
Nick Young	WAS-LAC	SF	1729	-0.004	-1.0	-$1,271,605	-$1,464,396	-$1,687,960	-$1,474,654
Ronny Turiaf	WAS-MIA	C	277	0.160	0.8	$1,798,010	$9,653,604	$1,782,699	$4,411,438

2003 NBA Re-Draft

This is the fourth installment in my NBA Re-Drafts series.  Today, I will cover the 2003 Draft which gave us LeBron, D-Wade, Chris Bosh, Melo, and others.  Others include busts Darko Milicic , Michael Sweetney, Jarvis Hayes and (surprise!) Chris Kaman.  (I’ll probably talk about Kaman late in the draft.)   I will still use Composite Score as my data point for player evaluation, but I have decreased my minutes requirement to 250 so that I would have more accurate results for certain players.  I will still evaluate team need the same way.  My data can be found at 2003DraftSpreadsheet.  Here we go:

1. Cleveland SF LeBron James St. Vincent-St. Mary HS (OH)  LeBron is indisputably the best player in this draft.  He is probably the best player of the past decade, except for maybe Shaq or Tim Duncan.  His rookie seaon is his only one where he did not record a Composite Score exceeding .200.  Like Yao last year, I didn’t bother to check the Cavs’ 2002-03 roster because he has been so amazing, even considering his lack of “clutch” ability (which is overrated, anyway).
2. Detroit SG Dwyane Wade Marquette Jr.  Before I became involved in the analytics movement, I would have slotted Chris Bosh here, no questions asked.  However, there are two reasons why I did not do this.  For one, Mehmet Okur was never a slouch until the last couple years.  He and Ben Wallace were a pretty good frontcourt even before the trade for Rasheed.  Second of all, Rip Hamilton is overrated.  Hamilton’s not terrible, but his scoring efficiency is very average and he isn’t a great rebounder for his position.  Wade or Rip could serve as a Sixth Man in 03-04, while Dwyane would take over in Year 2.  With this pick, the Pistons would have been almost unbeatable.
3. Denver PG Jose Calderon Tau Cermaica (ESP) 1981  Somehow, Calderon went undrafted in reality even though he was automatically eligible.  The 2002-03 Nuggets had the sub-zero Junior Harrington as its starting point guard.  I don’t think they would mind waiting a couple of years for this fantastic point guard, well-known for his high assist totals.  I would have selected Bosh here, but this team already had Marcus Camby and Nene, and Bosh would not have been much of an improvement over the Brazilian.
4. Toronto PF Chris Bosh Georgia Tech Fr.  Since he is unquestionably the best player remaining, the only players in his neighborhood play the same position, and he was the actual selection at this spot, I will go with Bosh almost by default.  Although he is not a star on the level of teammates James and Wade, he is still a star and has been for a long time.  As an efficient scorer who can block shots and doesn’t foul too much, he is a great value at the 4 selection.  He also gives them some life for the aftermath of the Vince Carter debacle.
5. Miami PF David West Xavier Sr.  Besides Eddie Jones, this Heat team didn’t have much to go on for the future.  In real life, they took Dwyane Wade.  In this scenario, Flash is long gone.  Although somewhat overrated because of his scoring totals, West has still been a serviceable starter who will block shots and definitely not kill you.  (Note that Wins Produced only credits him with four average seasons, including a rookie year where he was a star…in less than 1,000 minutes of action.)  Other targets include Matt Bonner and Nick Collison.
6. Clippers PG Kirk Hinrich Kansas Sr.  During the course of his rookie contract, Hinrich was a pretty good starter, but he declined earlier than players ahead of him.  However, this team already had Elton Brand and Corey Maggette (who isn’t as overrated as you would think), and Andre Miller was leaving in free agency.  Hinrich has a better 4-Year average than anyone in this draft not currently being paid like a superstar to play for Miami, or Josh Howard (who also had an early decline).  Because of his early success, he probably is a better selection than Bonner, Collison, Kyle Korver, and Melo (those available with higher 9-year averages).  This is not as much of a reach as I first though; in fact, I don’t think it’s a reach at all.
7. Chicago SF Josh Howard Wake Forest Jr.  Like the 2002 Draft, the 2003 draft was short on solid guards (although it did have two elite ones in Wade and Calderon).  Chicago already had Tyson Chandler and Donyell Marshall (who was pretty good), which eliminates a couple of candidates.  However, at small forward they had Eddie Robinson (who?) and Jalen Rose (who was turnover-prone and steal-averse).  However came off to a flying start in his five years before sinking into obscurity.  A frontline of Howard, Marshall, and Chandler (all last names that can be used as first names) would have been really good for a couple of years.  However, the Bulls would not want to overpay for his Restricted Free Agency deal.  Until then though, Howard was really good.
8. Milwaukee SF Carmelo Anthony Syracuse Fr.  With Michael Redd and Sam Cassell (who in reality they traded the very next day), the Bucks had some good guards.  At this point in the draft, that’s a good thing.  Their bigs were less inspiring but still capable, with Joel Pryzbilla (terrible at the time), Dan Gadzuric (had a couple of inspired years but not a whole ton else), and an aging Ervin Johnson (who would be packaged in the Cassell deal).  That leaves small forward, where they had an okay Desmond Mason and a retiring Anthony Mason.  (I guess they did a lot of stone cutting in Milwaukee.)  So that makes it a toss-up between Melo and Kyle Korver.  Both of them have had their seasons, but neither was consistently good until Year 7 or so.  At least with Melo, you have a high trade value.  I was hoping I could have Melo farther down, but oh well.
9. New York PF Nick Collison Kansas Sr.  This Knicks team was so old that only Charlie Ward and Clarence Weatherspoon had decent 03-04 seasons, and neither one of them had a good 04-05.  That means the Knicks are looking for the best player they can find.  In real life, they “found” Michael Sweetney (which wasn’t as bad as you would think, but it still wasn’t great.)  Collison missed 03-04 with injuries to both shoulders, but he has been a solid player ever since.  He has had only one below-average season, a Year 3 where he still posted a respectable .078.  He is also well-known for taking charges, which is a good thing.  Other possibilities include Matt Bonner, Kyle Korver, Marquis Daniels, Luke Walton, and (prepare to be amazed) James Singleton.  (P.S. While we were playing a game of Strat-o-Matic together, my dad christened him Nick Collision.  This was before either of us knew of us charge-taking prowess.)
10. Washington SF Marquis Daniels Auburn Sr.  Christian Laettner, Brendan Haywood, and Etan Thomas provided a solid rotation of big men.  However, between Jerry Stackhouse and Tyronn Lue and Larry Hughes’s overrated-ness and MJ’s final retirement, they had a shortage of wings and guards.  Daniels’s first three years are among the best of the draft, but then he goes through a steep decline, in part because of lowering assist totals.  Other possibilities include Luke Ridnour, James Jones, and Carlos Delfino.
11. Golden St. PF Matt Bonner Florida Sr.  Bonner spent a harrowing season in Italy (look at his Wikipedia page) before becoming a solid player in the NBA.  For a team with only Erick Dampier being a dependable player, Bonner would definitely be a serviceable starter.  Hopefully, the Warriors would have better luck extending Bonner than they did with Gilbert Arenas.
12. Seattle C Kendrick Perkins Ozen HS (TX)  Having traded upcoming free agent Gary Payton to Milwaukee and Predrag Drobnjak as its starting center, this team was in the market for a replacement at the two most important positions.  Perkins is the best of those player remaining.  It took him a little time to develop into a solid starter, but judging that he’s a high school selection, this is unsurprising.  A couple of years in Europe could have helped, admittedly, but almost any production would be more than they got out of Drobnjak.  This guy would definitely be worth a Restricted Free Agency deal.
13. Memphis (traded to Boston) PF James Singleton Murray St. Sr.  Wait, what?  James Singleton?  He of 243 career games!  Well, yes, I’ll tell you why.  Singleton is an extraordinary rebounder, racks up blocks and steals well for his position, and has been extraordinary throughout his career whenever he has gotten his shot.  Even though he spent two years in Italy before coming to the NBA, he is still selected here because there is a shortage of immediate help.  Furthermore, that is reduced even more when you consider that Boston’s one good player for the future was Paul Pierce, a small forward who can technically play either wing position.  It’s a shame that Singleton didn’t get a chance to play more; I’m sure he would have take advantage of it.
14. Seattle PG Luke Ridnour Oregon Jr.  This one of the few picks that is actually the same as it was in real life.  As I mentioned before, Seattle needed a point guard.  With Kenny Anderson and Kevin Ollie leaving in free agency, they didn’t have any left on the roster.  Ridnour has had some good seasons, particularly recently, and okay is better than bad is better than terrible.  It’s too bad Leandro Barbosa can’t play point guard.
15. Orlando PF Michael Sweetney Georgetown Jr.  This was a hard pick since Orlando need right away, but there isn’t much immediate help left.  Sweetney had a couple of good years (albeit in limited time) before fading into obscurity.  This guy had ability; he just didn’t put it all together, apparently.  This is definitely a reach, but the Magic would finish with the league’s worst record in 2003-04, so the right-now precludes the later.  They want to make the most of T-Mac, especially since he was to start his decline.
16. Boston (traded to Memphis) C Zaza Pachulia Ulkerspor (TUR) 1984  This team was headed by Pau, Shane Battier, and Mike Miller, and Jason Williams has pretty good.  Pachulia was a young player that the Grizzlies could afford to stash in Europe for a year.  (Zaza’s rookie year was abysmal with a Composite Score of .006, but he improved.)  They could sign him to a restricted deal on the cheap as his Year 5 was pretty bad, and then reap the benefits of four consecutive above-average seasons.  This will soon become a familiar tale.
17. Phoenix SG Leandro Barbosa Bauru Tilibra (BRA) 1982  Barbosa may be a little overrated, but he was still a good player for his first six seasons.  Because of a trade with San Antonio, The Brazilian Blur ended up with the Suns anyway, and it was a great fit.  However, the Suns would to be careful and only extend him for two years before he hits his decline.  (His would be marked by declining rebounding, assists, and scoring efficiency.)  Besides, isn’t Leandro Barbosa just a fun name to say?
18. New Orleans SF James Jones Miami (FL) Sr.  George Lynch and P.J. Brown were good forwards, but they were declining quickly.  Why not replace one of them in this draft?  Jones is a somewhat efficient scorer who almost never turns the ball over.  Part of this may be due to his role as a shooter, but he has averaged less than one turnover per 48 minutes four times!  He also has value under his second contract.
19. Utah PF Boris Diaw Pau-Orthez (FRA) 1982  With Stockton’s retirement and Malone leaving as a free agent, the Jazz have come to the end of an era.  While Andrei Kirilenko and Matt Harpring are solid forwards and Greg Ostertag is a solid center (Kirilenko being more than solid), the roster is a bit thin.  Enter Diaw.  Although not amazing, he is a solid role player who could the job done at either forward or (if he really had to) the center position.  In a re-draft like this, what more could one expect from pick 19?
20. Boston (traded to Memphis) SF Luke Walton Arizona Sr.  At one point, Walton was my favorite player.  His career started out well before being derailed by injuries.  While some of this skill level may have been caused by his perfect match for the triangle offense, the system does not make the player.  He could have backed up Battier well for four or five years before fading into obscurity.
21. Atlanta SF Carlos Delfino Skipper Bologna (ITA) 1982  This Hawks team had Jason Terry and Nazr Mohammed, but their other good players were starting to age.  Delfino spent an extra year in Italy, after which he could have replaced Shareef Abdur-Rahim.  He has been a solid player throughout his career and a good choice at No. 21.
22. New Jersey SG Mickael Pietrus Pau-Orthez (FRA) 1982  The Nets were a good team who could afford to pick just the best player available, regardless of position.  Although there were certainly other players who could have been selected here, I decided on Pietrus.  Pietrus may be a shooter who doesn’t shoot that great, but he is a solid player who I wouldn’t mind having on my team-most years.
23. Portland SG Keith Bogans Kentucky Sr.  Because of its aging roster, Portland is another team that should have drafted the best player available.  He may have had his ups and downs and been a bit of a late bloomer, but Keith Bogans became a good player.  Of course, the team that drafted him should have made sure that he stayed off the court in Year 2, but other than that he was a solid player.  He was definitely worth resigning.
24. Lakers PF Brian Cook Illinois Sr.  Another one of the rare re-draft/real life matches.  The 02-03 Lakers squad was Shaq, Kobe, Horry, and little else, and Horry left for San Antonio after the season.  Cook is the only player remaining with an above-average rookie season.  His Year 3 was also good, but the rest of his career was not.  Therefore, he could be easily jettisoned at the end of his rookie deal.
25. Detroit PG T.J. Ford Texas So.  Although injury-prone and a late-ish bloomer, Ford is a solid pick.  Hopefully, Detroit would able to resign him to a two-year deal to maximize the value of this pick.
26. Minnesota PG Steve Blake Maryland Sr.  At this point, no matter how a team is organized, you need to pick the best player available.  Blake could have benefitted from a couple of years overseas, but he was a solid starter for several years.  Besides, good is better than bad, which is better than terrible.
27. Memphis (traded to Boston) SG Quinton Ross SMU Sr.  Ross was a decent role player for several years, and there are few remaining who could eclipse his Year 4 Composite Score of .099 (only Chris Kaman’s Year 3, Kaman’s Year 5, and Ronald Dupree’s Year 2).  He was a solid rebounder and defensive player, and that’s much of what can be expected any more.
28. San Antonio (traded to Phoenix) PG Mo Williams Alabama So.  I’m guessing that many of you are surprised that Williams fell so far.  Well, Williams only had an average number of Points Per Shot for three seasons, which are also his only seasons in which he recorded a Composite Score above .060.  He is also slightly more turnover-prone than average without being an exceptional assister, a bad combination.  I’m not saying that I wouldn’t touch Williams with a ten-foot pole (although you could say that for Years 1 and 8), I’m simply saying that there are alternatives.  Like Quinton Ross.
29. Dallas C Chris Kaman Central Michigan Jr.  I’d bet you’re even more surprised that Kaman fell all the way down here.  However, he is turnover-prone and an inefficient scorer.  In his first two seasons, he was a below-average rebounder as well.  Kaman has a pair of good seasons surrounded by mediocre, terrible, and sub-zero campaigns.  Ouch.

As always, here I will type all of the first-rounders who did not make my re-draft.  They were:

1. PF Darko Milicic KK Hemofarm (SRB) 1985 (2-Detroit)
2. SF Jarvis Hayes Georgia Jr. (10-Washington)
3. PG Marcus Banks UNLV Sr. (13-Memphis-Boston)
4. SF Reece Gaines Louisville Sr. (15-Orlando)
5. PG Troy Bell Boston College Sr. (16-Boston-Memphis)
6. SF Zarko Cabarkapa Budcnost Podgorica (SRB) 1981 (17-Phoenix)
7. SF Sasha Pavlovic Budcnost Podgorica (SRB) 1983 (19-Utah)
8. SG Dahntay Jones Duke Sr. (20-Boston-Memphis)
9. SG Zoran Planinic Cibona Zagreb (CRO) 1982 (22-New Jersey)
10. SF Travis Outlaw Starkville HS (MS) (23-Portland)
11. SF Ndubi Ebi Westbury Christian HS (TX) (26-Minnesota)

Apparently, the only solid player that came out of that Boston-Memphis trade was Kendrick Perkins!  Remember, this is not meant to end discussions; it’s meant to start them.  Please comment with your opinions or any qualifying undrafted free agents that I have missed.  Thanks for reading.

Proposals for How a Relegation-and-Promotion System in College Basketball Might Work

This post is a continuation of my May 7 article, “Relegation and Promotion in College Sports.”  At the end of it, I mentioned that I might in the future write a follow-up article about how I would implement it for basketball.  While I do not have a single concrete idea, I do have several proposals and sub-ideas for individual portions and the system as a whole.  In a way, this is better than having just one idea because it lends itself to fleixibility.  Here goes nothing:

First of all, let me summarize my position for those of you who did not read my original article.  Even if you did read the original article, there are things I believe I should make clear coming that I cannot remember whether or not they were stated back on May 7.  I believe that college sports could be made better if they used a relegation-and-promotion system similar to those used in European sports.  Each region would be divided into tiers, and each year the best teams would advance and the weakest teams would be downgraded, based on a three-year weighted average.  I have been thinking about this idea for a long time, even before the current realignment craze.  With certain safeguards and restrictions, a somewhat regionalized NCAA system would allow mid-majors to get a chance at the big boys, prevent teams like Seton Hall and Washington St. from permanently holding onto berths in major conferences while clearly underpreforming, and still maintain key rivalries.  (Note that despite its format, that sentence was not my thesis statement.)  Although it may be undesirable to some people and will, in all likelihood, never be implemented, it’s a nice thought experiment that I enjoy doing.

I think that any relegation-and-promotion system should be somewhat regionalized (at least in conference play) to minimize travel costs.  Major colleges like Syracuse and Michigan St. could probably handle it, but what about Canisius and Holy Cross?  I have two proposals for these divisions: one with four regions and one with six.  I’ll start with the four-region one.

West: Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Oregon, Texas, Utah, Washington

Midwest: Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota, Tennessee, West Virginia, Wisconsin

South: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina

East: Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, D.C.

We would allow the Ivy League to remain separate from the relegation-and-promotion system, with some rules allowing it to maintain postseason berths.  With that exception, the East would have about 86 teams, the Midwest would have about 86, the West about 83, and the South about 81.  (I use “about” to leave room for error.)  I would build the conferences based on a six-tier 16-16-16-12-12-remainder model while ensuring that no tier had exactly 13 or 14 teams.  However, I prefer this second, six-region proposal.

West: Alaska, Arizona, California, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah, Washington, Wyoming

Central: Colorado, Iowa, Kansas, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Texas

Great Lakes: Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Ohio, Wisconsin

South: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, Tennessee

Atlantic: Delaware, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, Washington D.C., West Virginia

Northeast/New England: Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont

I know that this second proposal has some odd-shaped regions, but on the whole I prefer this one over the other one as far as travel and rivalries go.  Kentucky is in the Midwest under both proposals because the South is one of the larger regions; South Carolina is in the Atlantic for that same reason and that separating the Carolinas just didn’t feel right.  As for the Central, it could be a lot worse.  On the whole, I like this proposal better, even though you would never get Army-Navy conference play.  (Although the rivalry would not be killed.)  For this proposal, I would also give the MEAC and the SWAC, two conferences of historically black colleges, an exemption, but it works either way.  That leaves the Northeast with about 58 teams, the Great Lakes with about 55, the West and South with about 53, the Atlantic with about 48, and the Central with approximately 47 (again using “about” to leave room for error).   I would have five tiers per regional, with the number of teams possibly different for each region.

First, I will address the issue of how teams are relegated and promoted.  First of all, teams should be ranked by what I call Neutralized Points.  Neutralized Points would be a combination of a point system rewarding teams for winning games against opponents, adjusted using a series of computer rankings.  This way, teams are credited for scheduling tough competition and winning games without rewarding teams that feast on teams near the bottom of tiers or who underachieved.

The point system would be inherently simple, with different points being allotted for regulation wins, overtime wins, overtime losses, and regulation losses.  When recording point totals, I will do so in that order.  When playing conference opponents or those in a comparable tier, the points would be given out on a 3-2-1-0 basis.  I differentiate between overtime and regulation games simply because, in overtime, so much rides on the occurrences of a short timeframe.  If the opponent was from a higher tier, it would be 5-3-2-0.  If the opponent was in a tier directly below the team, the points would be 2-1-0-_1 (_ being negative), and two tiers would below would result in a 2-0-_1-_2 point award.  This is to award teams for scheduling tougher opponents while punishing teams for scheduling weaker oppositiion.  There would be no difference in points for home, road, or neutral play.

Then, a combination of several computer rankings (such as the Sagarin, Ken Pomeroy, RPI, and BRI) would combined in an average.  The NCAA average would be then normalized at 1.  After that, the computer ranking amalgamation, multiplied by the number of points, would result in the total Neutralized Points.

After that, the Neutralized Points would be boiled down to a three-year weighted average.  This weighted average would be used to determine the relegated teams.  The team with the lowest average would play the team with the forth-lowest average in a home-and-home series, and the second-lowest would play the third-lowest.  The loser of that series would be relegated.  No team in the top half of its division or quad (see tier scheduling) could be relegated.  If a top-half is team is in the bottom four, then teams would go down the list until a suitable replacement is found.  The exact opposite in each case, with no exceptions whatsoever, would used to determine promoted teams.

Of course, with a relegation-and-promtion system, there will always be the issues of games played and rivalries.  For the first, I propose having 10 non-conference games, 18 conference games, plus cup and relegation competitions which I will get to later.  In all, I believe that each team would play anywhere from 29 to 49 or 51 games, depending on which of my College Championship proposals is used.  I know it sounds like a lot, but it would still fall into the November-April timeframe if properly scheduled with lots of games during vacations.

How conference games would work would depend on how many teams are in that particular tier.  Up front, I mentioned that I did not want to have either an odd number of teams or 14-team conferences; when I do that, the eighteen-game scheduling gets pretty weird.  However, having a fifteen-team conference works.  I wanted to regulate the number of conference games to help keep everything symmetrical and in perspective.  Here it goes:

10 Teams: Double round-robin

12 Teams: Divide into two six-team divisions.  Play division opponents twice, conference opponents once, and see Extra Games Proposal for the other two games.

15 Teams: Divide into three five-team divisions.  Play division opponents twice and conference opponents once.

16 Teams: Divide into four-four team quads.  Play quad opponents twice and conference opponents once.

My Extra Games Proposal for 12-team conferences can take one of multiple forms.  For one, it could take the shape of a permanent, four-game annual rivalry between two teams.  If the situation were to arise, an example would be Duke-North Carolina.  The other possiblity is to have the two games split between two teams, either in the form of permanent rivalries and/or on a rotating basis amongst divisional opponents.

With any relegation-and-promotion system, there will be the issue of rivals that play in different tiers.  This is compounded by the fact that not all rivals are necessarily located in the same region.  A safeguard to help with the maintenance of these rivalries would to have them registered with the NCAA.  If a rivalry is registered, then the teams are required to play each other in a regular season game, excluding cup competitions.  Rivalries do not always have to be between just two teams; an example of a multi-team rivalry would be the Philadelphia Big 5 rivalry with Pennsylvania, La Salle, St. Joseph’s, Temple, and Villanova.

There would also be two cup competitions: one styled after England’s FA Cup, and the other similar to the UEFA Champions League.  The FA Cup-style tournament be a single-elimination cup competition, starting at the very beginning of the season with Teams No. 344 and 345, as ranked by the three-year Neutralized Points average, facing off at Team No. 344’s stadium.  Teams would gradually be added round-by-round, with the last byes entering in the Round of 64.  Games would be held with one round each week at the higher seed’s home court.  Teams would be unable to schedule games where it would be possible for them to play a Cup game and a regular season game on the same day or schedule a game on the day before a potential cup game.  (Cup games would be scheduled in order to allow to teams to accommodate two total games each week.)  The champion would receive an automatic bye into the group stage of the Champions League-style tournament.

The Champions League-style tournament would have 80 teams, selected by performance in their league.  For the actual Champions League, each nation’s system is ranked by a numerical coefficient based on success in European competition.  The qualifiers would be determined by a similar method.  Furthermore, the defending champions and the Cup winner would receive automatic byes into the group stage (bear with me).

It would start with 32 teams playing home-and-homes to qualify for a group stage.  These would take place on either a Thursday-Saturday or Friday-Sunday schedule.  For the 48 teams that are already safely in the group stage, it would be an off week.

Then, each team would be seeded 1-4.  A publically televised draw would determine 16 groups of 4.  No two teams from the same conference could participate in the same group.  Each No. 1 seed would host their group in either a three-game group stage or a double-elimination tourney.  (I would imagine that the latter would be easier to schedule since you know that there will be one or two games per group every day.)  Either way. the group stage would take place over a single weekend, preferably during either spring break or a holiday weekend to minimize lost class time.  The winners of each group would advance to the knockout stage.

There would be another draw selecting the eight matchups for the knockout stage.  Each round would be a home-and-home determined by aggregate points.  An five or ten-(I prefer ten) minute overtime would settle any ties.  I propose that there should be a rule that if the two games are split, then the aggregate total must be greater than the margin of victory in the game the aggregate loser lost in order to prevent overtime.  In other words, I believe that if one team wins the first game by 21 and the other team wins the second game by 13, an overtime period should still be played because 13 (the lower scoring team’s margin of victory) is greater than 8 (the difference in aggregate scores).  I believe that this might help competitive balance.  Of course, it’s also a harebrained idea (like so many of my other ideas).  The final would still be a home-and-home as well as every stage in my ideal dream world, although preserving the Final Four may just be a must.  The winner of this Champions League-style tournament would be the true NCAA champion.

Thank you for reading this post.  I would like to thank Uncle Popov’s Drunken Sports Rant (unclepopov.wordpress.com) and fetch9 from Rock Chalk Talk, a Kansas Jayhawks fansite (www.rockchalktalk.com) for ideas on the points system and the European-style tournaments, respectively.  (I understand that fetch9’s ideas were also inspired by others, but still.)  Although I have never communicated with either of them, I would like to say that I appreciate their ideas.  Please comment with your opinions.

P.S. This article was the cause of a blogging rut and the corresponding gap between my posts.  Sorry about that.

My Old Baseball Relegation-and-Promotion Essay

Last year, I wrote an essay called The Re-formation of American Baseball into a Relegation and Promotion System for a private Google Site.  Since I am in a bit of a blogging rut, I have decided to publish it.  Even though I no longer agree with the premise itself or many of its ideas, I feel compelled to publish something.  So here it is:

In European soccer, there is a system of player movement and team structure that is both functional and systematic.  Unlike the American format, each league system in European soccer has hundreds of privately-owned teams.  These teams are formatted in a system where every year, the top teams are promoted to a higher league, while the weakest teams are “relegated” into a lower one.  Instead of exchanging players for players, they are bought and sold for various, and often extremely high, amounts of money.  When this happens, their original contract is declared null and void.  On the other hand, American professional sports have several attributes and clauses, such as those of salary caps, that either the Europeans have considered copying, or would work in either situation.  This manual, for lack of a better term, describes how I would propose such a system to be implemented in baseball.  Due to out traditional use of the franchise system, this is mainly a personal release and food for thought.

Players

With the transfer of the minor leaguesand the sacrifice of all farm players from the major league to the minor league teams, which would occur if such a system were to be implemented, the use of player formatting comes into question.  The minors would have to be drastically adjusted.  My solution would be to have:

Farm Systems

Parent and Reserve Teams

Each team has a 40-man roster.  For each week, the team submits between twenty-three  and twenty-five players that are eligible to play for that team during the week.  There must be at least ten pitchers and twelve fielders.  The remaining players are optioned to a reserve team for the week.  Each Reserve Team is shared by two parent clubs.  Players may only be recalled during the registration period.  All salaries are paid in full by the parent club.  Reserve Teams may occupy the stadium of one of the parents clubs when the parent club is on on the road or play as a doubleheader with the parent club.

Youth Clubs

In addition to the parent and reserve teams, players may be optioned to a youth club.  At any one time, a team can send up to ten players to the Youth Club.  Each Youth Club is a joint venture by three teams.  A team may abstain from optioning the full number of players.  In this case, the other teams have a lottery to determine how many additional slots each team receives.  Each team must have five of the players optioned under the age of twenty-three, and eight of the players must be under the age of twenty-five.  The Youth Clubs are required to be financially self-sufficient, but the parent club would pay 75% of all salaries.  Stadium structure is the same as under those of the Reserve Teams.

Salary Caps

One element of most American sports that is extremely effective, and one that both baseball and European soccer sorely lack, is that of a salary cap.  This system works with a highly stringent salary cap containing both a floor and a ceiling.  The maximum cap may only be broken for three reasons: a) the team to resign a free agent for 75% of his previous year’s salary, b) to resign a player with less than one year of major league service who is younger than twenty-five for 100% of his previous years salary, or c) as a result of a lost arbitration case (see later) where the team’s offer was compliant with the salary cap.  There are also applicable reasons for breaching the salary floor.  They are a) a team is already in the red, b) the team was promoted for that season and was compliant with the previous level’s salary cap but, even after the Relegation Draft (see later), was still under the minimum cap, c) a team is currently in the black but, if it met the salary floor, it would be in the red, or d) it is undergoing an ownership change.

Spring Training

Spring Training would take place between March 1 and April 8.  Sixty-five players would be able to start on trial runs.  Each team would play thirty games, including at least game on every Saturday.  On March 31, rosters would have to be cut to fifty-five players, and final fifty-man squad would be declared on April 8.

Individual Salaries

At the onset of this system, players are able to retain their current contracts.  However, beyond that, all salaries must be compliant with the salary cap.  A single player’s salary may not consume more than 15% of the cap ceiling or 20% of the team payroll.  At the opposite end, players must consume at least 1% of the minimum cap and 0.25% of the team’s payroll.  These figures do not include the 25% salary that the Youth Club would pay while the player is optioned there.  Once a contract has been signed and agreed upon, paycuts can only be made at the mutual consent of the Owner, Vice President of Baseball Operations, and the player concerned.  However, the contract would then be either extended or pensioned, whichever the player decides.  If a player is released, 25% of the remaining salary would be pensioned, and the remaining 75% would be null and void.  Bonuses do not count against the salary cap unless they exceed one million dollars.

Contract Lengths

Recent draftees, after the draft, sign specific contracts (see more under arbitration) .  However, for players who have already  lived out a contract, no deal can exceed seven seasons, including team and player options.  This does not include lengthenings caused by paycuts.  Loan Deals and Waiver Wire acquisitions are not exempt from the Seven-Year Limit.  Contracts may be extended at any time, but this voids the original document.

The Draft

As opposed to one, major, all-encompassing Amateur Draft, there will be several siphoned off into regions.  Each Draft would be required t have at least one team in each level participate.  The Draft Order would be determined by level and standing in that level.  Relegated and promoted teams are considered to be how they stood in the previous season as opposed to how they would stand as if their records had been transferred to the corresponding league.  There would be five rounds of a standard Draft.  Teams may select any player from the region who declared themselves eligible for the Draft.  College Seniors are automatically eligible; Juniors, Junior College transfers, and High School players must declare their eligibility.  College Freshmen and Sophomores from four-year colleges are ineligible unless they have already graduated.  Players who did declare their eligibility may elect to return to school if they either go undrafted or cannot secure a contract before the Free Agency Period.  If either occurs, they may also become a Free Agent.   The Draft will be held the first Saturday after season’s end.  Between the draft and Spring Training, no draftees may be released.  Teams in Level 5 or lower may select a sixth pick the day before the Free Agency Period.

Rookie Contracts

Rookie contracts behave the same way as a normal contract except that they are automatically five years long.  At the end of the contract, if the team and the player cannot agree to a deal, they must hold an arbitration hearing where both teams provide a two-year contract offer and a judge selects which one will be valid.  One contract must be decided.

Player Movement

With the instituion of several levels, there comes the question of how players can be moved.  Although the old system worked before, that, to a degree, goes out the window.  In addition, in European soccer, teams are known to drastically overpay other teams in exchanging players.  To combat these issues, the system of player movement would change to include:

Trades

Characteristics: Teams may exchange players for players (and draft picks) in the same way teams in American sports always have.  However,  teams of no more than two levels may be concerned in any one trade, and cash flow in these trades would be disallowed.

Transfer Periods: Between the day after season’s end and July 31 for teams of the same level; Between the beginning of the Free Agency Period and March 1, or June 17 and July 31 for teams of different levels.

Free Agency

Characteristics: Any uncontracted player may be signed to a new contract.

Transfer Period: Between the beginning of the Free Agency and March 1, or between April 15 and July 31

Transfers

Characteristics: A team may declare any particular player Transfer Listed.  The League reviews the player and assigns a monetary value to him.  Teams may then offer cash to the player’s team in exchange for his services.  The offer must be between 90 and 125% of the Transfer Value.   The team may accept  offers for the player as they wish.  Then, the player negotiates with the teams whose offers  were accepted.   In the meantime, his current team may choose whether or not to play him in the current games.  Once contracts with the player and one the teams are agreed upon, the player chooses which team he wants to play for.  All Transfers take effect immediately after League Approval.  When a Transfer is finalized, the player’s original contract is declared null and void. Periods: Between the beginning of the Free Agency Period and March 1, or between June 17 and July 31

Waiver Wires

Characteristics: A player is Waived as opposed to being released.  After that, all the other teams in the level, in order from worst to best record at the time of the Waiving, have twelve hours to claim the player.  They may refuse the player at any time during the period, and, after twelve hours, the player remains unclaimed.  Teams that claim a player have seventy-two hours to agree to a Trade or a Transfer with the original team.  If no deal is agreed upon, the cycle continues in the same order.   If no team in the same level claims the player, the cycle continues with the level directly below, then directly above.  If he is still unclaimed, he returns tot the team. Periods: Same as Transfers

Loans

Characteristics: Two teams establish a player’s temporary movement to another team.  Loans may take place over a period of between one and twelve months.  The two teams agree upon which percentage of a player’s salary is paid by which team.   Loaned players count against the acquiring teams’ cap if  the spell is sixth months or longer, the current team’s if less than sixth months.   The acquiring team may choose whether or not they want to pay the current team, but if they do not pay, the player is recallable. Periods: Same as Free Agency

Revenue Sharing

Oftentimes, teams lose money.  Therefore, teams might need a financial boost from teams with a positive balance sheet.  Teams would only need to revenue share with teams that were in their level during the previous season.  For each level, a median profit level would be found.  All of the teams above the median would be required to share 25% of the excess  above the median.  Teams in the red would not have to share revenue.  The shared money is thrown into a pot and evenly distributed among the teams that had profits below the median.

Relegation Penalties and Promotion Bonuses

When a team is relegated or promoted, there are catches.  For promoted teams they are positive, for relegated teams, they are negative.  Many of the promotion rewards are at the expense of the relegated team.

The Dispersal Draft

When a team is relegated, they must have excess cap room for the lower level.  To do so, the relegated team releases some of its players into a pot.  After this, the team must have $50K cap room for every player released.  Then, the promoted teams are free to draft any of the players in an order selected by a lottery.  If there are not enough players remaining for each team to draft one, the excess players become Free Agents.  If a drafting team exceeds the player and cap limits, it may release only one of its draftees.  All other released players must have been on the roster since at least July 31.  The relegated player may resign the release player for a 75% cap hit for twelve hours after the release.  If the two parties fail to agree on a contract within the time limit, the cap reduction is lost, and business returns as usual.

Team Bonuses

The relegated team must pay the promoted team 75% of the previous year’s revenue share, regardless of whether they shared or received.

Drafts

The promoted team receives an additional draft pick from either its own or the relegated team’s region, applicable at the end of the draft.  The relegated team is unaffected.

Pros and Cons

Pros

Minor league cities with teams that do well get a major financial boost

Players are not “stuck” in a specific level if their team does well

More players have a chance to play professional baseball

The system is less foreign to Europeans

Home-grown players raise ticket sales

Horrible teams do not stink up the major league perennially

The best players play in the best leagues

Well-performing teams are rewarded

Players get to the big leagues faster

There are salary limits

There is a salary cap

Cons

The initial price is highly negative

A good prospect could get stuck on a really bad team

Towns with really bad lower-level teams will suffer

The minor league system basically unravels

Another Study in Replacement Level

Last week, I used the average value of a win and the NBA’s rookie minimum salary to find the NBA’s Replacement Level.  Yesterday, I was trying to determine the monetary value of each player’s win contribution using Composite Score over 48 minutes rather than Composite Wins.  In other words, I was trying to find a player’s monetary value solely determinant on performance and not play time, while still using $1,700,000 per win as a benchmark.  I decided to determine value by having each win per 2,000 minutes (a good total for a starter) be equal to the $1,700,000 threshold.  I then found the number of 48-minute divisions out of 2,000, and divided 1 by that number to determine the value of the breaks I should use.

Guess what number I came up with.  Exactly .024 Wins Per 48 minutes.  I think I should take this as my first definite proof that .025 Wins Per 48 minutes is the replacement level in basketball.  (To see what I was trying to do clearly instead of in my jumbled-up language, view Values.  My “discovery” is off to one side.)

May 20 Quotes for the Week

“The wheel is come full circle.”  William Shakespeare

“The least movement is of importance to all nature.  The entire ocean is affected by a pebble.”  Blaise Pascal

“Failure is success if we learn from it.”  Malcolm Forbes (Unfortunately, I don’t.)

“It’s easier to go down a hill than up it, but the view is much better at the top.”  Henry Ward Beecher

“Confidence is contagious.  So is lack of confidence.”  Vince Lombardi

“Individual commitment to a group effort-that is what makes a team work, a company work, a society work, a civilization work.”  Vince Lombardi (Ouch…I don’t work well in groups!)

“A single conversation across the table with a wise man is better than ten years mere study of books.”  Henry Wadsworth Longfellow

2002 NBA Re-Draft

This is my latest installment in my NBA Re-Drafts series.  As always, I will use Composite Score (my average of Wins Produced Per 48 Minutes and Win Shares Per 48 Minutes) for all seasons in which the player played 500 minutes.  My team judgments are based on my looking at both Win Shares and Wins Produced without combining them into Composite Score.  My data is available at 2002DraftSpreadsheet.  If I have forgotten any undrafted players who had at least one qualifying season, please comment.  (I haven’t gone through one where I haven’t-yet.)  Here it is:

1. Houston C Yao Ming Shanghai Sharks (CHN) 1980  Even though Yao’s career was cut short by injuries, I selected this pick without even looking at the Rockets’ roster.  There are some reasons for that.  For one, Yao has the second-best 9-Year Composite Average, behind only Carlos Boozer, of any player in this draft despite playing only 94 minutes in Years 8 and 9.  This draft might not be the greatest, but that’s still pretty amazing.  His Year 4 is the best single season of anyone not named Boozer or Amare.  He was a franchise center.  He is 7’6″.  In all seriousness, there is no way you can possibly consider anyone else by any means, conventional or analytic.  You just can’t.
2. Chicago PF Amare Stoudemire Cypress Creek HS (FL)  I really swung back and forth between Boozer and Amare, but in the end I chose Amare.  Even considering how obscenely underrated Reggie Evans, no one else was even in the discussion.  My rationale for picking Amare was that even though he had major injuries and an earlier, more precipitous decline, his best seasons were better, and his injury would allow his current team to pay less in Restricted Free Agency because it occurred during his contract year.  With Tyson Chandler already there, this would have been an amazing dynamic duo (offense-defense and all).
3. Golden St. PF Carlos Boozer Duke Jr.  The best player in the draft, according to Composite Score, goes third in the draft.  I’ve already explained why.  This Warriors squad needed a player who could come in right away because Gilbert Arenas was walking the next year.  They have Antwan Jamison, but he’s overrated, and Boozer can play the center if he has to.  (Note that this is when Erick Dampier was average, before he actually became a really good player.  Furthermore, the NBA Geek lists Jamison as a small forward in 2001-02.)  Besides, only Yao, Reggie Evans, and Dan Gadzuric have 4-Year Averages within 30% of Boozer’s.  (Yes, Gadzuric was really good for a couple of years, too.)
4. Memphis C Nene Hilario Vasco da Gama (BRA) 1982  Having Pau Gasol and Shane Battier already, this is a terrible draft for the Grizzlies.  The best guards in this draft are John Salmons, Devin Brown, and Fred Jones (the latter two of which are better than originally thought but were not consistently amazing).  So, Memphis gets to improve at the center position.  Although Stromile Swift wasn’t terrible, he wasn’t that great either (rarely better than average), and Nene is definitely an improvement.  Of course, you have a major, major knee injury and testicular cancer (seriously?) thrown in there, but he really only lost two seasons.  The alternatives are reaching for Dan Gadzuric and hoping that Tayshaun Prince or Mike Dunleavy can play shooting guard as well as they play small forward.  (I’m not too sure about the former.)
5. Denver PF Reggie Evans Iowa Sr.  Between trades and Antonio McDyess rupturing his patellar, this team’s only average players are James Posey and Ryan Bowen, two guys who both played small forward.  Bowen was a weird-looking white guy who rarely played.  Yeah, I think this team needed help wherever it could get it.  In real life, they got Nikoloz Tskitishvili.  He was terrible, and who can even pronounce that (Republic of) Georgian name?  Evans is a tremendous rebounder who has remained fairly consistent throughout his career.  In Year 8, he doesn’t have a data point because Toronto wouldn’t let him play.  You’d have trouble trading him.  Rewind, let me rewrite that.  He’s so underrated that it would be virtually impossible to get 25 cents on the dollar for him even though he has no major character issues.  (I would accentuate the point further, but I can’t do it without cussing.)  Of course, it’s better than just betting three good seasons from Drew Gooden or Dan Gadzuric.  That’s more palatable than it sounds, but still….
6. Cleveland SF Tayshaun Prince Kentucky Sr.  The remaining players on this team would amount to Andre Miller, Zydrunas Ilgauskas, and not much else.  Miller was traded to the Clippers for pocket change, and Wins Produced doesn’t look at Big Z favorably for another year.  Considering that the best point guard in this draft is either Mike Wilks or Dan Dickau (yes, this draft has no frontcourt value), the Cavs should just pick the best player available (even if he would supplant their resident Lithuanian).  Luckily for Ilgauskas, Prince is (somewhat) clearly the best player on the table.  (He is definitely the most consistent one left of any value.)  Although not the most important player on the Pistons’ championship team (that being either Billups or Ben Wallace), he was a very important piece with a UK pedigree.  He’s mile better than Dajuan Wagner, the actual selection.  (In Dajuan’s defense, he did have to have much of his colon removed.  Again, really?)
7. New York (traded to Denver) PF Udonis Haslem Florida Sr.  Haslem went undrafted in real life.  In the defense of all twenty-nine NBA teams, Haslem did use his year in France to lose a lot of weight.  It paid off.  Haslem has been a very solid player for most of his career, and his Year 3 is the second-best season remaining (behind Dan Gadzuric’s Year 3.)  Of course, his Year 6 Composite Score was .068, which is by no means anything to write home about.  Over the long haul, Haslem wasn’t that great, although as I have said, he had some good seasons.  Of course, that’s why he’s being picked at No. 7 and not say, 3.
8. Clippers C Dan Gadzuric UCLA Sr.  Only Boozer, Yao, and Reggie Evans have better 4-Year Averages in this class.  Of course, this guy is a reach because he did almost nothing after that.  (In Restricted Free Agency, this is the type of guy you let walk.)  There are a couple of guys left who had better careers than Gadzuric, but the Clippers already had Elton Brand, Lamar Odom (who Wins Produced panned at the time), Corey Maggette, Quentin Richardson (who Win Shares isn’t too, too fond of), and Darius Miles (later traded, had a good 2003-04 according to Wins Produced).  Looking at that frontcourt, maybe I should have reached even further for John Salmons, Devin Brown or Fred Jones.  Nah, I’ll stick with Gadzuric, but this shows you that this draft was not stellar.
9. Phoenix PF Drew Gooden Kansas Jr.  Phoenix needed bigs.  They had Stephon Marbury, Joe Johnson, Shawn Marion (extremely underrated), and one or two more decent years from Penny Hardaway.  On the other hand, their bigs were an old Bo Outlaw (not bad, but…), an old Tom Gugliotta, and Jake Tskalidis (underrated, but still unspectacular).  Gooden took two years to develop, but he became a solid big.  Years 3-5 were good, 6 and 7 were bad, and 8 and 9 were decent (.112 and .083).  Besides, he has a reputation as a good guy, which would hopefully help some with Starbury.
10. Miami SG Devin Brown UT-San Antonio Sr.  Eddie Jones and Brian Grant solidified the forward spots for the heat.  This is the year before Alonzo Mourning missed a whole year because of that kidney disease he got (again, really?).  However, the next best center is Nenad Krstic, a real reach who stayed in Europe for two more years.  Those two factors lead me to reach for Brown.  (Although John Salmons had a higher 9-Year Average, all of his average seasons are beyond the scope of his rookie contract.)  Brown, when he got his chance, he was a pretty good player with a Year 2 Composite of .146, a Year 3 of .154, and a Year 5 of .117.  The Year 5 can be constructed into his rookie deal via a D-League stint; having spent much of his time there that year, he only took part in 93 NBA minutes in 2002-03.  Brown was just very underrated in the beginning, but do not sign that offer sheet, Heat; after Year 6, he played two more seasons, both of which were below Replacement Level (.025).
11. Washington SF Caron Butler Connecticut So.  Intuitively, the Wizards organization would try to do its very best to “win one for MJ.”  Caron Butler has the best rookie season and 4-Year Average of any player left on the board.  Part of the charm is that Butler and Jordan play the same position at (in that season) approximately the same level.  This would allow Butler to give MJ a rest while also giving Jordan a solid number of minutes and a starting job.
12. Clippers SG Fred Jones Oregon Sr.  When covering the Clippers’ previous pick, I gave a long list of how the Clippers’ frontcourt was stacked.  That narrows the list of possible selections to Salmons and Jones.  However, Salmons took a really long time to develop (he had no average seasons under his rookie contract), while Fred Jones did develop while the drafting team’s control.  Fred Jones has a solid Year 2 and Year 3, then declines, allowing the Clippers to not overpay for him in Restricted Free Agency (although he does have a couple of okay seasons remaining).  It’s just too bad that there are still no point guards worth picking.
13. Milwaukee PF Darius Songaila Wake Forest Sr.  In this draft, it’s a good thing that the Bucks already have a trio of great guards in Ray Allen, Sam Cassell, and Michael Redd.  However, their leading per-36 minute rebounder was a 34-year old Earvin Johnson, followed by rookie Joel Pryzbilla.  Songaila was a good rebounder who put up solid Composite Scores within the realm of his rookie contract.  For some weird, unknown reason, I seem to be against drafting Mike Dunleavy.  Hmm….
14. Indiana PF Luis Scola Tau Ceramica (ESP) 1980  This is a solid team that could definitely afford to draft a stash player like Scola.  Scola certainly was a good player to stash; when he came over he had two good seasons, a decent season, and then receded.  This way, you get short-term value that you can let go and not feel worried about losing him in free agency.  Besides, somehow, I don’t think drafting a wing would sit too well with Ron Artest (now Metta World Peace).
15. Houston Mike Dunleavy Duke Jr.  If this really happened and I was in the Houston organization, I would be thanking God Almighty until I was blue in the face.  Dunleavy did not fall this far because he has been a bad player.  Alternatively, he has consistently been a pretty good player.  However, the way this draft was, very few teams actually needed a small forward once Tayshaun Prince was taken.  Caron Butler went ahead of Dunleavy because the Wizards should have needed a win-now player, which Dunleavy wasn’t.  This was just a funny case of circumstance.
16. Philadelphia (traded to Golden St.) SG John Salmons Miami (FL) Sr.  Salmons is another one of those guys who fell because he was a fairly mediocre player early on.  At this point though, there aren’t many players who would fit here better.  Salmons did become a solid player; it just took a while.  For the Warriors to really cash in on this pick, they should have convinced Salmons to spend some time in Europe to hone his skills.  I think that would work.
17. Washington PG Mike Wilks Rice Sr.  Like I said during their previous pick, the Wizards should have been looking for players who could help them right now.  Unfortunately, there aren’t any of those left.  However, Wilks certainly wouldn’t have hurt them, and he has the best rookie year left, aside from one-year wonder J.R. Bremer.  He and Tyronn Lue could have split time, and I think it would have worked out.  Wilks only had one other 500+ minute season (2006-07), but that’s in part because he was an undrafted journeyman.
18. Orlando (traded to Utah) PF Jared Jeffries Indiana So.  Utah, like Washington, is one of those shooting for a last hurrah for a star.  In this case, there are two-John Stockton and Karl Malone.  Even though Malone played in 2003-04, the ensuing season would be his last in Utah.  Jeffries could not come in and produce right away, but he could learn from Malone.  He would develop into an approximately average player, and he is one of the better players available.
19. Utah (traded to Orlando) PF Chris Wilcox Maryland So.  This team already had Tracy McGrady, the oft-injured Grant Hill, and Mike Miller, so they didn’t need help on the wing.  This is especially true when you realize that the year after this draft is the one where T-Mac went bonkers and had a Composite Score of .270.  That eliminates the candidacy of Matt Barnes, Damien Wilkins, Rasual Butler, Jiri Welsch, and Casey Jacobsen.  That leaves Wilcox and Nenad Krstic.  In that case, it’s a good thing the Magic did need bigs.  Wilcox has the advantage of not staying in Europe for five years.  Wilcox has had a good career, and there is no shame in selecting him.
20. Toronto (traded to Lakers) SG Casey Jacobsen Stanford Jr.  Jacobsen could provide a good two years of backing up Kobe Bryant.  At this point, that’s practically all you can ask for.
21. Portland SF Matt Barnes UCLA Sr.  With many of its key players starting to decline (or be Zach Randolph), this team needed a player who could become something.  Barnes became something.  It just took him a while to become really something.  What they could have done is draft him and sign him to a long contract in Restricted Free Agency at a discounted rate.  Then, they sign him to an extension before Year 8 (when he really took off), keeping him through this year.  Since we’re now extrapolating into the current future (I know it’s oxymoronic, but bear with me), I can’t say any more, but still.
22. Phoenix C Nenad Krstic Partizan Belgrade (SRB) 1983  Like I said earlier, Phoenix needed bigs.  Unfortunately, we are now at the point where the only bigs left of note are Krstic, Lonny Baxter, Qyntel Woods, and Christian Borchardt.  Unfortunately, Krstic stuck around in Europe for two more years.  The alternatives are Rasual Butler (not that great for not that long), Roger Mason, Jr. (first five years, no 500+ minute seasons), Jiri Welsch (short, largely mediocre career), and Bostjan Nachbar (see Butler).  I’m liking Krstic a lot more now.
23. Detroit SG Jiri Welsch Union Olimpija (SLO) 1980  This is the part of the program where having one halfway-decent season is a point in your favor.  His Year 2 was pretty okay, and at least he won’t rip your heart out of its socket.  Enough said.
24. New Jersey SG Roger Mason Virginia Jr.  He didn’t have a 500+ minute season until 2007-08, but at least he did have were pretty good.  This draft class didn’t have a whole lot of depth.  (Note that at this point, I am just picking the best players available at any position-it’s that bad.)
25. Denver (traded to New York) SF Rasual Butler LaSalle Sr.  His Year 2 and Year 7 provided Composite Scores of .094, but his 9-Year scope was bookended by sub-zero seasons.  However, Bostjan Nachbar is the only player remaining with multiple seasons with a Composite Score of .050 or greater.  That makes Butler look much better.
26. San Antonio (traded to Philadelphia) SF Bostjan Nachbar Benetton Treviso (ITA) 1980  Speaking of Nachbar (rhymes with snock bar), here he is.  Again, at this point mediocrity is a plus.  (I’m sorry for the increasing brevity of these later picks, but there’s just nothing to write about for these guys.)
27. Lakers (traded to Toronto) PG Smush Parker Fordham Jr.  The water here is so shallow, your knees break the surface.  It’s embarrassing.
28. Sacramento (traded to Atlanta) PF Lonny Baxter Maryland Sr.  Thank goodness the Timberwolves forfeited their pick because of the Joe Smith scandal; otherwise, I’d have to suffer through another one of these picks.  At least he didn’t have a subzero 500+ minute season ever.

They say that the 2000 NBA Draft is bad.  This one is still better than that atrocity, but this one’s still pretty bad.  I was getting to the point where anything north of the 0 line was a good year!  Well, here is my traditional list of the first-rounders who didn’t make the cut in my redo:

1. PG Jay Williams Duke Jr. (2-Chicago)*
2. PF Nikoloz Tskitishvili Benetton Treviso (ITA) 1983 (5-Denver)
3. SG Dajuan Wagner Memphis Fr. (6-Cleveland)**
4. PF Melvin Ely Fresno St. Sr. (12-Clippers)
5. PF Marcus Haislip Tennessee Jr. (13-Milwaukee)
6. SG Juan Dixon Maryland Sr. (17-Washington)
7. C Curtis Borchardt Jr. Stanford (18-Orlando-Utah)
8. PF Ryan Humphrey Notre Dame Sr. (19-Utah-Orlando)
9. SG Kareem Rush Missouri Sr. (20-Toronto-Lakers)
10. SF Qyntel Woods Northeast Mississippi CC So. (21-Portland)
11. PG Frank Williams Illinois Jr. (25-Denver-New York)
12. SF Chris Jeffries Fresno St. Jr. (27-Lakers-Toronto)
13. PG Dan Dickau Gonzaga Sr. (28-Sacramento-Atlanta)

Geez, Louise; there are almost as many second rounders in my re-draft as first-rounders.  I’m sure most of these guys, especially Tskitishvili, could have benefitted from maxing out their pre-draft eligibility.  As for the asterisks, * Jay Williams almost died in a motorcycle accident.  However, his rookie year was pretty terrible anyway, and ** Dajuan Wagner suffered from ulcerative colitis and had most of his colon removed.  He made a brief, unsuccessful comeback with the Warriors, then played a year in Israel before retiring.  He was atrocious before the surgery though, anyway.

While on the subject of Wagner, John Calipari actually revoked his scholarship after his freshman year so that Wagner would have to declare for the NBA Draft.  Gee thanks, coach, look where that got me.  Honestly, I’m surprised that more Coach Cal haters don’t bring this up very often.  Oh, look, he pushed this guy into the NBA.  He was terrible, then got a disease and never was successful.  Wow.

Back on track now.  Again, these articles are not meant to end discussions; they’re meant to start them.  Please comment with your opinions.